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SUMMARY 
This study investigated how Thai-Chinese family retailers have managed to survive 
within the context of the rapid expansion of large foreign retailers since the mid-1990s, and how 
the characteristics of Chinese businesses evolved.  The findings showed that the two 
case studies, Eternity and Fortune, in a north-eastern province of Thailand could adapt 
their businesses to the changing ecosystem because both firms had dynamic capabilities 
that allowed them to discern trends, capture opportunities by making the right 
investment and reconfigure their assets.  Compared with Teece (2007)’s dynamic 
capabilities model, the microfoundations of these firms were relatively informal.  
Processes and procedures that undergirded the dynamic capabilities were not fully 
rationalised and still embedded in the executives.   
Eternity and Fortune evolved from small traditional Chinese family businesses to 
professional firms. The changes were an attempt to improve the competitiveness of the 
firms. The business owners still focused on only one business area of specialisation. 
While the control was still in the hands of the owners, the practices such as the 
paternalistic and centripetal control were not practical with the growing size of their 
companies. Corporate governance was used in place of the traditional gongsi system to 
prevent family conflicts. The attempt to decentralise and bring in professional managers 
and lower staff was apparent.  Both cases moved towards the increasing formality in 
business operations.  The interpersonal relationship was still practised but it 
progressively changed into professional relationships and weak ties.  The strong ties 
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from the older management could be seen but both parties needed reciprocity to 
strengthen the ties. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I discuss the problem statement and the aim of the study, and then 
describe the outline of the thesis. 
1.1  Problem Statement  
Since 1950, the global retail sector has been greatly transformed.  Giant retailers such as 
Walmart, Carrefour, Metro, Home Depot and IKEA, have consolidated the global retail 
markets and this process has resulted in  changes of practice and relationships between 
suppliers, retailers and customers.  The US retail formats such as supermarkets, big box 
stores, supercentres, malls, and internet-based stores have diffused to many areas around 
the world (Hamilton and Petrovic 2011).   
Thailand also witnessed the effects of global retail transformation over the past two 
decades.  After the 1997 financial crisis, the Thai government invited foreign 
multinationals to resuscitate the economy.  Rules and regulations were changed to attract 
foreign investments because local entrepreneurs were weak and lacked capital 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2008).  Thailand implemented a WTO agreement to liberate the 
service sector which included the long-time protected retail industry.  
The economic context was changed into a competition between foreign capital and 
domestic capital (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008).  There has been a significant increase 
in the number of large international retailing stores, especially in the aftermath of the 
1997 financial crisis.  The meteoric expansion of global retailers such as Tesco (UK), 
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Carrefour (France) and Big C (Casino group, France) in Thailand led to the decline of 
many local retailers.  Tesco has grown from five branches in 1996 to 114 branches in 
2009.  Intense competition drew complaints about unfair competition from foreign 
operators.  This economic nationalism was invoked by local entrepreneurs to fight 
foreign retailers.   
The expansion of foreign stores to many parts of Thailand negatively affected local retail 
operators who comprised mostly Thai-Chinese businesses.  Some local stores were taken 
over by foreign retailers whilst some ceased to operate (Kanchoochat 2008). Only a few 
family-owned stores could turn around their businesses and compete against rival 
foreign stores by adopting professional management and a modern trade model.   
This change of business environments in the Thai retail sector led the government and 
academics to focus on this issue.  The Retail Act is being drafted to control the anti- 
competitive strategies of the large retail operators.  Scholars provided studies and policy 
options to create fair competition and reduce the impact on local and small retailers. 
However, these studies tended to focus on macro level and the negative effects on 
traditional retailers (c.f. Paopongsakorn and et al. 2002).  There are limited empirical 
micro-level studies that explain how the successful Thai-Chinese retailers adjusted 
themselves and competed against the foreign stores.  
Like other Southeast Asian countries, the leading local retailers in Thailand are mainly 
Thai-Chinese (Butler and Hean 2000).  Overseas Chinese have been an important engine 
that has propelled the growth of economic activities in Southeast Asia (Hamilton 2006). 
The Chinese have run their businesses based on Chinese values and traditions (Tsui and 
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Lau 2002); there are four main characteristics of Chinese businesses, namely 
paternalistic control, informality, reliance on interpersonal networks and diversification 
of businesses (Tong and Yong 1998; Hamilton 1996). 
The low level of competition in the past partly contributed to the success of Chinese 
entrepreneurs (Chan 2000).  However, after the 1997 financial crisis, foreign operators 
dramatically invested and competed in this region.  To sustain their wealth, Chinese 
businesses had to adjust their businesses to the new ecosystem (Tsui and Lau 2002:20; 
Li and Tsui 2000).  The question that arises is whether there will be a dominance of 
Western business practices or a convergence between Western and Chinese practices.  
Some scholars believed that Chinese firms would ultimately adopt the Western 
management practice to increase their competitiveness (c.f. Landa 1983).  Others 
contended that the Chinese values and practices will be continued but some Western 
practices would be merged with the traditional practice of Chinese firms (c.f. Hamilton 
2006; Yeung 2008).  
1.2  Aim of the Study  
The aim of this study is to investigate how the Thai-Chinese businesses in the retail 
sector manage to survive in the changing context of the Thai economy during the past 
two decades and how their characteristics of Chinese businesses evolve.               
To examine how the Thai-Chinese retailers adjust themselves in the changing business 
environments, the analysis of macro processes and determinants (retail globalisation and 
Chineseness) is complimented with an organisation-level analysis --dynamic 
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capabilities.  The dynamic capabilities approach is drawn from the strategic management 
field which focuses on how firms create and maintain competitive advantage (Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen 1997).  Dynamic capabilities are argued to help firms sustain their 
competitiveness in the changing ecosystem.  These capabilities comprise three 
capabilities –sensing, seizing and managing threats.  That is, managers and business 
owners must be able to sense the trend of new businesses from internal and external 
sources and seize opportunities by investing and implementing a new business project at 
the right time.  Moreover, managers must be able to manage threats by continuously 
realigning their assets with the emerging threats or opportunities (Teece 2007). 
The dynamic capabilities’ model of Teece (2007) is used as the main framework of the 
thesis to explain how Thai-Chinese retailers in Thailand have managed to survive in the 
new competitive arena during the past two decades.  Specifically, this study looks into 
both organisational level capabilities and microfoundations (processes that support the 
dynamic capabilities) that enable the Chinese retailers to sense and to capture business 
opportunities, as well as to adjust themselves when the threats emerge (e.g. the 
expansion of foreign retailers).  
Regarding the contribution, firstly, this thesis applies the dynamic capabilities 
framework to illuminate the evolution of Chinese businesses and retail 
internationalisation.  This is an attempt to combine insights from strategic management 
and Chinese business literature.  Secondly, this study explored to what extent the 
dynamic capabilities approach could be applied to a non-technological industry such as 
the retail industry.  Thirdly, the findings of this thesis could explain how overseas 
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Chinese businesses with limited resources in the Asia Pacific region adapted and 
competed in this globalised economic era.  It could also shed light on the divergence and 
convergence of Western and Chinese business practices.  Finally, the micro level 
explanation of dynamic capabilities can supplement the previous macro study of the 
transformation of the Thai retail industry by showing how the retailers developed and 
executed their competitive strategy to compete with foreign retailers.   
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
In Chapter two, I explore theoretical and empirical studies on the topic of Chinese 
businesses and dynamic capabilities, and then elaborate upon the research questions and 
conceptual framework of the thesis. Chapter three describes the comparative case study 
method and research procedures.  In Chapter four, the globalisation of retailing and the 
retail industry in Thailand are analysed to provide the context of the transformation of 
the Thai-Chinese retailers.  Chapter five outlines the background and development of 
two Thai-Chinese retailers during the past two decades.  Chapter six examines how the 
two cases have adjusted their businesses and managed their dynamic capabilities in the 
changing environments.  Chapter seven investigates the changes in features of the 
Chinese businesses.  Finally, Chapter eight discusses the key findings and draws some 
implications on the dynamic capabilities and the evolution of Chinese businesses.  
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2. BACKGROUND   
This chapter discusses the theoretical developments and empirical studies that are 
needed to understand how the Chinese businesses adapted their organisations in the 
context of the changing business environments.  I begin by discussing the context of 
research in Chinese businesses, their main characteristics and the relevant debate in 
section 2.1.  Section 2.2 deals with dynamic capabilities which are used as the main 
framework of this study to explain the features that enable firms to survive in dynamic 
environments.  Finally, section 2.3 elaborates the research questions and conceptual 
framework of the thesis. 
2.1  Chinese Businesses 
Overseas Chinese have been a key economic actor that has driven the capitalist 
development of the Southeast Asian region for centuries (Hamilton 2006). Chinese 
values and traditions have influenced how the Chinese have managed their businesses 
(Tsui and Lau 2002); however, in the context of globalisation, the convergence between 
Chinese and Western management has also appeared to increase, hence, in order to 
better understand the adaptation of the Chinese firms in the context of a globalised 
economy, this section discusses the key literature regarding Chinese businesses. 
Asian businesses: the context of Chinese businesses   
Research interests in Asian businesses have grown since 1980 with the success of 
businesses in this region.  However, the research seems to be fragmented into each 
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discipline (such as management and political economy).  Yeung (2007) discussed the 
three strands of theoretical perspectives of the research in Asian business: 
1) Research on Asian firms: This area focuses on the resource-linking ability within 
firms and between organisational networks and business groups (keiretsu, chaebol and 
Chinese conglomerates). 
2) Institutions, states and business systems analysis: Researchers study the role of 
“developmental states” in providing, directing and intervening in the development of key 
economic sectors.  The linkages between business groups and states are analysed.  Social 
and cultural institutions (e.g. role of guanxi as social institutions) are also explored to 
account for the variety in performance of Asian businesses. 
3) Global processes analysis: Global value chain and global production networks are 
investigated to explain the influence of the global market on the adjustment of the Asian 
businesses.    
Concerning the potential research in Asian businesses, useful concepts from various 
disciplines should be integrated.  The studies should establish a linkage between the 
micro and macro level. Institutional frameworks of Asian countries should be analysed 
since the role of states and institutions are distinct from the West (Yeung 2007). 
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Approaches to the study of Chinese businesses  
Within the context of Asian business studies, researchers pay significant attention to the 
field of Chinese businesses.  There are three major approaches to studying Chinese 
businesses (Tong 2008).  
1) Cultural approach: 
This is based on the Confucian and post-Confucian hypothesis of the spirit of Chinese 
capitalism (Redding 1990; Yao 2002).  The weakness of this approach is an 
oversocialised view. It is unable to explain the variations in organisations which share 
cultural beliefs (Hamilton and Biggart 1986) 
2)  Economic approach 
This view claims that the economic rationality determines the organisational structure.  
The organisational structure would evolve a common form in order to achieve efficiency 
(Williamson 1985).  Long and Han (2008) argued from the neo-institutional economic 
perspective that the practices of the Chinese entrepreneurs in the past were influenced by 
the lack of supporting institutions, rather than the cultural factors.  This approach, 
however, cannot account for the various forms of organisations such as hybrid, hierarchy 
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3) Institutional approach    
This approach believes that the various forms of organisations arose due to historical 
differences and the dynamics of businesses.  Hamilton (2006:10) pointed out that 
institutions do not directly affect the outcome of economic activities.  However, they 
only provide frameworks to constrain and enable actors.  In fact, capitalist economies are 
driven from the rationality of actors within their economies.  The economic interactions 
in capitalist systems are focussed upon exercising control in order to maximise each 
participant's interests.  Organisational arrangement in the economies is only affected 
indirectly by institutions or roles of states. 
Furthermore, Hamilton suggested the combining of institutional analysis with 
organisational dynamics and the use of comparative methods.  For example, capitalism 
should be studied in terms of several units (entrepreneurs, firms, money, products, 
markets and industries) that interact with each other.  Capitalism is dynamic through 
time and space.  The interactions in economic activities could transcend national 
boundaries since capitalism is a global phenomenon.    
“Chinese capitalism” is another research attempt that tries to incorporate all the 
explanations from these three approaches.  “Chinese capitalism” refers to a “historically 
and geographically specific form of economic organization that refers to the social 
organization and political economy of the so-called “overseas Chinese” living outside 
mainland China, particularly in East and Southeast Asia” (Yeung 2008:32). This type of 
capitalism is not a distinct form because it is embedded in socioeconomic contexts.  
Also, the characteristics of “Chinese capitalism” have continuously evolved.   
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“Chinese capitalism” comprises four major elements (Yeung 2008).  First, the family 
firm is the fundamental platform (which is influenced by the Chinese culture) for wealth 
accumulation.  Unlike the family firms in other continents, the Chinese family 
businesses create complex and cohesive bonding networks to provide funding and 
business opportunities.  Second, its form of economic organisation is “supra-national”.  
The firms have developed their unique management styles (e.g. Taiwan) and their 
activities are not limited to one particular host country.  Third, there is a strong influence 
of Chinese culture on the rationality and socioeconomic practices. Fourth, social actors 
such as families and business groups play a crucial role in the economic activities 
because of the absence of institutional supports that are available in the West.  
Characteristics of Chinese businesses 
Previous research has discussed the key features of Chinese businesses as follows. 
1) Paternalistic and centripetal control  
Chinese firms mostly start by using a partnership structure.  Then, they consolidate 
power and create family businesses (Tong 2008).  Chinese firms are paternalistic and 
tend to centralise control at the head of family.  To control the firm, they use 
mechanisms such as interlocking of directorship or setting up a holding company. 
2)  Informality  
Chinese firms lack clear rules and documentation for running business.  Close linkage 
between family and business exists and thus it sometimes causes awkwardness in 
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performance evaluation and painful conflicts among family members. Unlike Western 
family firms which have a high level of individualism, Chinese family firms are a 
kinship network of reciprocity and credibility (Hamilton 1996).  
3) Reliance on interpersonal networks  
Principal Chinese values encompass the need for harmony with the cosmic pattern and 
the inseparability of relationships from humans (Needham 1954:582).  The notion of rule 
of law only exists in the West where states set institutions to stabilise the market 
liberalism. The role of the Imperial Chinese state was to preserve social order and the 
state left regional merchant associations to regulate themselves by using collegial 
networks.  This was, in fact, a form of interpersonal networks to manage risks (Hamilton 
1996). 
4) Diversification of businesses 
Chinese businesses tend to be SME and middlemen in trading businesses; thus they are 
more vulnerable to fraud committed by outsiders or insiders than large international 
firms (Tong 2008).  Chinese firms are inclined to pursue portfolio management 
(Hamilton 1996).  The Chinese inheritance custom also affects the structure of 
companies.  Among Chinese firms, the equal partitioning of assets between sons is 
practised.  Thus, the firm would be more likely to diversify its business to related areas 
than to enlarge the firms themselves.  This would facilitate the asset separation after the 
death of the leader of the household.   
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In summary, these characteristics of Chinese businesses reflect the practice of 
personalism.  Tong (2008) argued that distrust and paternalism lead to the practice of 
personalism among Chinese businesses.  Chinese entrepreneurs tend to have deep 
distrust towards outsiders and institutions.  In the past, the harsh environments for doing 
business (e.g. the discrimination of the state, the absence of rule of law, corruption and 
exploitation) normally resulted in system distrust.  Social instability and psychological 
insecurity in Imperial China are believed to be factors that led to the creation of guanxi 
(Gold et al 2002).  
Guanxi  
Guanxi are interpersonal relationships or closely-knit networks that the Chinese use to 
facilitate smooth business transactions (Tong and Yong 1998:76).  Guanxi depend on the 
mutual ground --“base”-- of two parties in the relationship.  The common ground can be 
ascribed (such as dialect, locality and kinship) or acquired (such as workplace and 
associations or social clubs) (Peter Ping Li 2007; Tong and Yong 1998).  However, these 
bases do not automatically create guanxi and they have differential impact on guanxi 
(Tong and Yong 1998:77).  
Some suggested that guanxi is caused by cultural factors and institutional environments 
extant during the Imperial China era and also the uncertainty in the contemporary 
economic situation (Li 2007; Yao 2002).  To establish guanxi, sharing a guanxi base is 
required. If the common ground is not available, a middle person could act as a bridge to 
guarantee the trustworthiness between the two parties.  Mutual affection will also 
determine the quality of guanxi (Tong and Yong 1998; Hamilton 1996).  
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Guanxi is different from Western social networks due to their different institutional 
context.  Asian societies normally give importance to kinship and localism whilst 
Western society focuses on rule of law and individualism.  Thus the organisational mode 
of association is different (Hamilton 1996).  Guanxi is created to exchange personal 
favour on social, non-economic objectives at the beginning. The relationship is usually 
on a personal level but can be transformed later to an organisational level when needed.  
The investment in relationships is not always measurable and does not guarantee future 
help or benefits. Both parties could have unrelated goals and interests in the guanxi 
network.   However, Western networks are normally created to exchange economic 
benefits among organisations with common goals and strategy. Clear commitment and 
specific obligations are essential.  The Western relationships tend to last as long as both 
parties could strategically support one another on an equal basis (Luo 2007:50-52; Yao 
2002:103).   
Future of Chinese businesses 
In the context of globalisation, institutional transformation and the demographic 
changes, a debate emerges between the scholars who believe that the Chinese 
entrepreneurs would adopt the Western corporate practices and those who claim that the 
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1) The dominance of Western business practices 
This view represents a fundamental change in “Chinese capitalism”.  Researchers of the 
economic approach predicted that the Western way of business management would be 
triumphant.  The superiority in efficiency and benefits of Western management style will 
be rational for Chinese entrepreneurs to change their practices.  For instance, Landa 
1983) argued that the professional way of doing business would gradually replace the 
personal way (based on mutual trust) among Chinese businesses. 
2) The merge of Asian and Western business practices 
Some scholars believed that the practice of Chinese businesses would not regress. The 
changes, however, would be incremental because the practices have been 
institutionalised.  Tong and Yong (1998: 87) contended that the institution of 
personalism is resistant to change.  Certain inefficient practices may still be in use 
because they possess value in that particular institutional context.   According to Levitt 
and March (1988), organisations can sometimes refuse to innovate because they might 
get used to the old ways of doing business and might create working procedures around 
those practices.  Change can, nevertheless, occur when the taken-for-granted 
assumptions and myths of the practices are deinstitutionalised (Zucker 1977). 
Regarding the model of evolution, some scholars believed that “the West and the East 
are converging toward network capitalism” (Li 2007:77).  Globalisation is the driving 
force for convergence but institutions (e.g. cultures of each country) would drive for 
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divergence.  So it would be a combination of models and organisational practices from 
the East and the West (M. Peng 2007).   
Hamilton (2006:217) argued that the diffusion of capitalism in Asia is path dependent.  
There would not be the dominance of a Western capitalist model.  However, these 
countries would come up with their own ways of doing business that are suitable for 
their social contexts.  The diffusion of capitalism is a process of adoption and adaptation 
to make the best practice complement with the native ways of working.  
Another model that supports the argument of incremental change is hybrid capitalism.  
Yeung (2008) argued that the globalisation (economic and social trend) would transform 
the norms, beliefs, institutions as well as economic and social structure of Chinese 
capitalism and would result in a new generation of Chinese entrepreneurs. 
 
2.2 Dynamic Capabilities   
The success of Chinese entrepreneurs in the past has been partly attributed to the low 
level of competition (Chan 2000). After the 1997 financial crisis, Asian markets were 
more open to foreign competitors. Many Chinese firms needed to adapt their businesses 
to sustain their wealth (Tsui and Lau 2002:20; Li and Tsui 2000). To fully understand 
how the Chinese firms adjusted themselves in the changing ecosystem, I complement the 
macro processes and determinants (retail globalisation (see Chapter 4) and Chineseness), 
with organisation-level analysis --dynamic capabilities. The capabilities approach is 
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most developed in the strategic management and organisation studies literature. The 
following section briefly discusses the development of organisation studies and strategic 
management to provide the context of the dynamic capabilities approach and rationale 
for using this approach in the thesis. 
Organisation Studies 
Organisation studies grew rapidly after WWII, scholars in the U.S. from various 
disciplines --ranging from social sciences, engineering, decision science, to management 
science-- studied this topic using scientific method, statistical analysis and empirical 
observation (Scott 2004:4).  This development was in the context of positivism and 
behavioural perspective academic influences in the 1950-60s (Augier, March, and 
Sullivan 2005:86).  Despite the early interdisciplinary nature of organisation studies, the 
field began to migrate to business schools and managed to establish a quasi-disciplinary 
status at the end of the 20th century (Augier et al. 2005). 
Some scholars categorised organisation studies into four types based on the ontology and 
epistemology of the theory: (1) pre-history, (2) modernist, (3) symbolic-interpretivist, 
and (4) postmodernist (Hatch 2006). Organisation studies can also be classified by 
disciplinary perspectives -- social psychology, economics and sociology (Cyert and 
March 1992).   
The social psychological approach tried to address how people in organisations achieve 
productivity and efficiency as well as problem solving behaviours in workgroups (Cyert 
and March 1992:17).  The application of economic views to study organisations derives 
      17
its insights from organisational economics.  Researchers aim to explore the nature of the 
firm (rationale for this form of organisation), internal processes (employment, contracts, 
decision making) and boundary of the organisation.  Some major theories in this area 
are: the theory of the firm (Coase 1937); behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and 
March 1963;1992); and the resource-based view (Wernerfelt 1984), evolutionary 
economics (Nelson and Winter 1982) and transaction cost economics (Williamson 
1985). 
Organisational sociology can be seen as a subfield of organisation theories.  The 
boundary of the two fields is indistinguishable because new insights are exchanged 
between the academic communities (Scott 2004:4-5).  From 1945 to the 1950s, 
sociologists mainly studied the determinants of organisation structures by describing the 
distinct features of organisations and the origin of these features.  During the 1960s- 
1970s, scholars adopted an open systems perspective and expanded the analysis from an 
individual organisation to its environment as well as to a higher level such as 
organisational populations and organisational fields.  The research interests in this period 
include the determinants of organisational structures which led to influential theories 
such as contingency theory, transaction costs, resource dependence theory, network 
theory, organisational ecology, and institutional theory.  Unlike economist and 
management theorists who focused on performance and efficiency, sociologists also paid 
attention to the consequences (groups who gain or lose benefits), and the distribution of 
power and status (ibid: 9) 
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The current issues of organisational sociology reflect the changes in economic and social 
systems.  Researchers now explore the blurred boundaries of organisations due to the 
emergence of strategic alliances between firms and the practice of temporary hiring and 
contract employees (ibid:11).  Another topic of interest is the “externalisation” strategy; 
organisations now increasingly dispose of functions or units that used to conduct their 
business internally in order to focus on its core competence (ibid: 11).  Finally, the mode 
of control in organisations has changed from a unitary and hierarchical model to a 
decentralised and vertical one.  This trend becomes evident in the high tech industry. 
Strategic Management 
Dynamic capabilities are a recent academic endeavour in the field of strategy.  This field 
aims to answer some fundamental questions such as how firms build and maintain 
competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997:509).  After WWII until the 
1970s, the field of strategy and business policy focused upon case studies and the 
process of strategic decision making of the individual firms and managers (Helfat n.d.).  
In 1980, Michael Porter’s industrial economic approach on competition research shifted 
the focus of the field to analyse the effects of industry on businesses to answer the 
question about why some firms are more profitable than others.    
In 1984, the resource-based perspective was put forward and argued for the importance 
of internal assets of the firm as a factor that can determine firms’ competitiveness.  The 
research onto the internal resources of firm expands accordingly.  At this stage, the field 
became more interdisciplinary and drew upon insights from organisational sociology and 
industrial psychology.  The last two decades have shown how the new environment of 
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competition where technology changes very fast and the avenue for competition moves 
to the global scale, and have led scholars in the strategy area to begin to explore the 
dynamic capabilities approach to address how firms can adjust themselves and survive in 
this context (Teece et al. 1997:515). 
Key Perspectives in Strategic Management  
Up to the present day, there are four dominant paradigms of strategic management 
research: competitive forces, strategic conflict, resource-based views, and dynamic 
capabilities.  The first two perspectives are based upon “strategising” logic whilst the 
last two are based upon “economising” logic as a source of competitiveness (Teece et al. 
1997: 509-510). 
Competitive forces or positioning views. 
Competitive strategy of Porter (1980) focuses on the study of the firms and their 
environment.  Industry provides rules of competition for firms. The key argument of this 
model is that in order to create high profits, firms seek to manipulate competitive forces 
in the industry by adapting their position within the structure and rules of industry.  
Given its focus at the industrial structure, this framework pays little attention to firm 
specific assets; even though these assets could result in differential performances among 
firms in the same industry (Teece et al. 1997:511).  
      20
Strategic conflict  
Shapiro (1989) adopted game theory to explain how a firm's action could impact the 
competitors and the market such as a decision to invest in a new plant and a technology.  
Intelligent manipulation of the market and firm’s action against its competitors could 
bring about high profits.  
The weakness of this approach is the lack of predictive power because this model 
accepts “multiple equilibrium” and each game involves various choices of action (Sutton 
1992).  Another weakness is that firms’ actions would not normally result in or respond 
to the other firm's strategic moves.  Some firms might react or fail to respond due to their 
limited capabilities.  Finally, by focusing too much on how to outplay the rivals in the 
strategic games, managers may be blindsided by the need to create a long term 
competitive advantage (Teece et al. 1997:512). 
Resource-based views 
The profits and competitive advantage of firms arise from the uniqueness or scarcity of 
their resources.  Thus, firms with such resources could offer products with a better 
quality or at a lower price, and this resource capability is difficult to imitate (Wernerfelt 
1984; Teece et al. 1997:513). 
Firms in this perspective possess diverse and unequal amounts of resources.  In the short 
term, it is, thus, difficult to change the resource endowment (ibid:514).  Secondly, some 
resources such as internalised knowledge cannot be purchased.  This approach also 
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transforms the diversification (vertical and horizontal integration) into a strategic issue 
that could lead to higher profits.  However, resource-based views are regarded as static 
approaches due to their emphasis on current firm-specific assets. 
 
Dynamic capabilities  
Dynamic capabilities build upon resource-based approaches.  Both perspectives 
acknowledge the importance of unique resources and capabilities.  Dynamic capabilities 
solve the static issues by focusing upon the dynamism of environments and how firms 
adjust their resource base (Teece 2007:1344).  In the fast-paced environment, firms need 
to build competence and acquire necessary resources from internal and external 
sources.   
This paradigm integrates the studies of research and development, technological 
development, organisational learning, intellectual property regime, and strategy. Firms 
can achieve competitive advantages from good processes, and solid asset positions in the 
markets. The ensuing success is path dependent (Teece et al. 1997: 509-510, 518) 
Dynamic capabilities and its recent developments  
After the seminal paper of Teece et al. (1997), the research in this area has expanded 
considerably.  The perspective is applied to fields such as marketing, R&D and family 
businesses (c.f Bruni and Verona 2009; Chirico 2008).  Nevertheless, the dynamic 
capabilities approach is still in its early stage of development.  The research mainly 
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focuses upon the foundational topics such as the nature and effects of this construct.1  
Empirical work is limited due to the lack of consensus on the definition and assumption 
and basic concepts (Helfat and Peteraf 2009; Barreto 2010). 
Overview of Teece’s dynamic capabilities framework 
The seminal paper by Teece et al. (1997:518) argued that “the competitive advantage of 
firms lies with its managerial and organizational processes, shaped by its (specific) asset 
position, and the paths available to it”.  However, it seems that Teece (2007) 
downplayed the use of asset positioning and focused more on the enterprise level 
capabilities and micro-foundations that undergird it.  In the 2007 model, dynamic 
capabilities “relate to high-level activities that link to a management's ability to sense 
and then seize opportunities, navigate threats, and combine and reconfigure specialized 
and co-specialised assets to meet changing customer needs, and to sustain and amplify 
evolutionary fitness, thereby building long-run value for investors” (Teece 2007:1344).   
Figure 2.1 illustrates Teece’s dynamic capabilities framework.  This framework is, 
however, not a “model” that aims to specify theoretical relationships between 
variables. This integrative frame mainly provides key variables (capabilities and 
microfoundations) for the analysis. 
                                                 
1
 See the debate of the nature and effects, recent empirical works and critique of dynamic capabilities in 
appendix A. 
































































































Figure 2-1: Dynamic capabilities framework of Teece (2007, figure 4:1342) 
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From Figure 2.2, there are three types of enterprise dynamic capabilities --sensing, 
seizing, and managing threats/transforming.  Capabilities are separated from the 
microfoundations2 --organisational and managerial processes, systems, structures, 
distinct skills, procedures, decision rules, and disciplines (ibid:1321).   
Dynamic capability is “the foundation of enterprise-level competitive advantage” 
(Teece 2007: 1341).  Resources, including firms’ operational capabilities, can only 
maintain technical fitness (Teece 2007:1344).  If firms only have resources, such as 
adopting best practices and investing in a new technology, they will possess a 
temporal competitiveness.  To achieve sustainable competitiveness in the long 
term, dynamic capabilities are essential.  Dynamic capabilities, orchestrating skills3 
and microfoundations comprise tacit knowledge and idiosyncratic characters of that 
organisation.  This nature makes it hard for competitors to imitate. 
This framework also pays attention to “entrepreneurial management”; that is, 
managers should be able to sense the opportunities and threats, and to reconfigure 
the business by combining internal and external resources and drive the necessary 
                                                 
2
 The focus on microfoundations can be seen as an attempt to include behavioural perspective to the 
dynamic capability approach which is heavily based on economic rationality and resource-based 
views (Helfat and Peteraf 2009).  Dynamic capabilities are critiqued as “groundless” and have no 
links with organisational research; the framework focuses more on the higher-level capabilities than 
the real processes of organisations (c.f. Arend and Bromiley 2009). 
3
 Orchestration process include “coordination/integrating, learning, and reconfiguration—as core 
elements of dynamic capabilities” (Teece et al. 1997) and “[t]hese processes are a sub-set of the 
processes that support sensing, seizing, and managing threats” (Teece 2007:1341). 
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changes.  In the fast paced environment, the role of managers4 is to monitor and fill 
the gap of the firm's competitiveness.  Teamwork and decentralisation of decision 
making in the organisation becomes more important for enabling the information to 
flow from the operation to the management level (Teece 2007:1336).  This view is 
consistent with the evidence from empirical work showing the effect of managerial 
cognition and the role of management in shaping firms’ dynamic capabilities (c.f. 
Narayanan, Colwell, and Douglas 2009) 
This framework, in addition, assumes that businesses operate in an open economy 
where new ideas, knowledge and technology are widely accessible.  The key 
success factor is to create uniqueness, innovation, and intangible assets (such as 
intellectual property).  Firms must have a good business model and management 
possess dynamic capabilities.  Management must be visionary, and far-sighted to 
discern opportunity and threats (Teece 2007:1346). 
The enterprises that would be the most suitable for using this framework are 
multinational corporations that operate in fast paced technological environments.  
Moreover, these firms need to search and utilise several technologies in their 
businesses.  They should participate in global and mature markets.  Hence, to apply 
this framework to the retail sector might be challenging. Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) suggested, however, that dynamic capabilities could be applied to other 
industries since nowadays every industry operates in a “moderately dynamic” 
                                                 
4
 The roles of managers include: (1) orchestrate resources, (2) choose governance models and 
design incentives, (3) create business models, (4) bring about changes and innovation, (5) select 
appropriate investment, (6) lead and motivate staff, and (7) create and drive controls and operations.  
He argues that economic theory does not pay enough attention to the roles of managers (Teece 
2009:68). 
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environment.  Also, using this framework with other industries may allow us to see 
the varying impacts of dynamic capabilities.  
In summary, the dynamic capabilities framework enhances the past work in 
strategic management by including three enterprise level capabilities and micro-
foundations.  It aspires to answer the basic but most important question in strategy  
-- how to find an opportunity, capture it, and sustain it (Teece 2007:1346-7) 
Nature and microfoundations of dynamic capabilities 
In this section, the nature of three capabilities and corresponding microfoundations 
are described.  
Sensing 
1. Nature of capability  
This capability is crucial in the fast changing economy where customers, 
technologies and competitors frequently change and most emerging trends are 
difficult to pinpoint (Teece 2007:1322).  According to Kirzner (1973), firms can 
detect opportunities in two ways.  First, they gain access to valuable 
information.  Second, information and knowledge result in opportunities. 
Firms must search for internal improvement and external opportunities for 
technology, innovation, new markets, customers’ demand and industry structure 
(e.g. competitors, suppliers, government’s policy, and social ethics) (Teece 
2007:1322). 
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2. Microfoundations  
Entrepreneurs require cognitive skills (to recognise opportunities after having 
access to the information) and creative skills (ibid:1323).  These skills are not 
inherent in every person.  Hence, firms should establish a framework, process or 
system that has the ability to sense or recognise trends in 
organisations.  Decentralisation could increase the information flow up to the 
decision makers.   
Managers should possess a framework, such as competition analysis, to analyse 
these trends and external factors. The search activities for technology and solutions 
should cover various sources; firms should create open innovation process where 
the search is not local. The following could be a good source for solutions, 
innovation, and ideas:  (1) customers' demand, (2) suppliers, and (3) 
complementary products and business partners (ibid:1324).  
Panza and Thorpe (2009) argued that managers have an active role in building 
dynamic capabilities.  The managers are involved in the creative search and 
strategic sense-making.  These two cognitive processes complement the 
experiential learning of the organisation.  Leaders should allocate resources for 
collecting and analysing trends in the ecosystem (Teece 2007). 
Figure 2.2 depicts the sensing microfoundation: “analytical systems (and individual 
capacities) to learn and to sense, filter, shape and calibrate opportunities.”  Teece 
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(2007:1326) suggested four elements of this micro-foundation5  which include: (1) 
processes to direct internal R&D and select new technologies, (2) processes to tap 
supplier and complementor innovation, (3) processes to tap developments in 
exogenous science and technology, and (4) processes to identify target market 
segments, changing customer needs and customer innovation.   
 
Figure 2-2: The sensing microfoundation: Elements of an ecosystem framework 
for “sensing” market and technological opportunities (Teece 2007, 
figure 1:1326) 
Seizing  
1 Nature of capability 
This capability is to turn the opportunity into reality by making the right 
investments (when, where, how) and improving their technological and operational 
processes. Good investments must be supported with a good business model that 
determines key processes and incentives (Teece 2007:1326). 
                                                 
5
 Teece (2007:1342) noted that these elements are “selected” processes of micro-foundation.  The 
framework does not aim to list all processes for each micro-foundation.  Hence, when applying the 
framework to different cases, this list may be adjustable.  
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Sometimes the implementation towards the new business plan is hampered by 
factors such as bureaucratic features of the organisation, centralisation of decision 
making, resistance to change and promotion of status quo, and inadequacy of 
competent staff. 
2. Microfoundations 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the seizing microfoundation: “strategic decision skills/ 
execution.”  Four elements related to enterprise structures, procedures, designs, and 
incentives for seizing opportunities are proposed: (1) delineating customer solution 
and business model, (2) selecting decision-making protocols, (3) selecting 
enterprise boundaries to manage complements and control platforms,6 and (4) 
building loyalty and commitment (Teece 2007:1329-1334).  
 
Figure 2-3: The seizing microfoundation: Strategic decision skills/execution  
(Teece 2007, figure 2:1334). 
                                                 
6
 Platform is a foundation part of product systems.  Intermediate products need to build or function 
on the platforms in order to create value for end customers.  For example, Windows operating 
system is a platform for other softwares (Teece 2007:1332). 
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Managing threats and reconfiguration 
1. Nature of capability 
Firms that can identify technological and market potential and make a timely 
investment based on a solid business model could grow and make profits.  They 
could use profits to increase enterprise-level resources and assets. In order to 
maintain profitable growth, firms need a capability to manage threat and 
reconfiguration.  That is, they should be able to adjust and reshape assets and 
structures of the firms during the changing environments of their business (Teece 
2007:1334).   
The capability to manage threats and reconfigure business is important to sustain a 
competitive advantage.  This is because past success would create some 
organisational routines which promote operational continuity. Once there is a 
change in an ecosystem, these routines need to be adjusted.  However, to change 
old procedures could cause stress and uncertainty in the firms that lack the culture 
to promote internal change (Teece 2007:1335) 
2. Microfoundations  
Figure 2.4 exhibits the microfoundation of managing threats and reconfiguration: 
“combination, reconfiguration, and asset protection skills.”  This microfoundation 
helps firms to realign tangible and intangible assets to match the changing 
ecosystem.  It comprises four elements:  (1) decentralisation and near 
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decomposability,7 (2) governance and incentive structure, (3) cospecialisation,8 
and (4) knowledge management (Teece 2007:1336). 
 
Figure 2-4: The microfoundation for managing threats and reconfiguration: 
Combination, reconfiguration, and asset protection skills (Teece 
2007, figure 3: 1340) 
 
2.3 Research Problem and Conceptual Framework  
From the review of the literature, Tsui and Lau (2002) suggested that the changes 
within Chinese firms in the globalised economy were still under researched.  
Moreover, there has been a debate in the research of Chinese businesses, especially 
the evolution of Chinese firms as to whether they would adopt the Western 
                                                 
7
 Near decomposability means the delicate balance between the autonomy to make decisions 
rapidly and the connectedness of activities which must be coordinated (Simon 2002 cited in Teece 
2007:1337). 
8
 Cospecialised assets means “a particular class of complementary assets where the value of and 
asset is a function of its use in conjunction with other particular assets”. An example is light bulbs 
and electric power system of Thomas Edison. (Teece 2007:1338) 
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corporate practices or preserve the Chinese businesses’ characteristics (Wong 
2008).   
In the strategy field, scholars argued that dynamic capabilities enable firms to stay 
competitive in the fast-changing business environments and survive in the long 
term.  However, the literature of Chinese businesses has paid little attention to 
these strategic capabilities of the Chinese firms.  Thus, this study aimed to link the 
two literatures by adopting the dynamic capabilities approach to investigate the 
business process and micro-foundations of the Chinese firms in the globalised 
economy.  Furthermore, this research aspired to examine how the characteristics of 
Chinese businesses have evolved in the globalised economy. 
This thesis explores how Chinese businesses have adjusted themselves to sustain 
competitiveness in the changing ecosystem by using the retailing industry in 
Thailand as a case study. Like other Southeast Asian countries, Thailand has 
witnessed rapid changes in the retail industry over the past two decades during 
which the foreign retailers significantly expanded their investment.  However, 
studies of the Thai retail sector have been limited and mainly focused on the macro 
level. A few studies explored the impact of this globalisation of retailing on the 
Thai retailers from economic perspectives such as the neoclassical work of 
Paopongsakorn and et al. (2002) and the heterodox work of Yordkamolsart and 
Sangchai (2001). Kanchoochat (2006, 2005) utilised an institutional economic 
approach to compare the effects of institutions on the development of retail sectors 
in Japan, Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. The micro level analysis is still lacking; a 
few works explained the effect of culture on consumer habits and perceptions on 
private-label products (Shannon 2009).  The research into how local operators 
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adapt themselves to compete with foreign stores is still limited.  Hence, the study 
of the Thai-Chinese retailers would also contribute to the debate on the future of 
Chinese businesses by giving empirical evidence of how the Chinese business 
practices have undergone change so as to maintain and enhance their 
competitiveness.  
The research problem in Chinese businesses, dynamic capabilities and the Thai 
retail sector leads to the following research questions. 
1. How could the Thai-Chinese retailers manage to survive and grow in the 
changing context of the retail sector over the past twenty years? What are the 
characteristics of dynamic capabilities of these firms? 
2. How do the Chinese features of these firms evolve? 
Rationale for using dynamic capabilities framework  
I used the model of Teece (2007) as the main framework of the thesis because it 
covers both organisational level capabilities and microfoundations (processes that 
support the dynamic capabilities).  Although some suggested using constructs such 
as change management or life cycle approaches, since the dynamic capabilities 
approach does not provide much theoretical contribution (see critique of Arend and 
Bromiley (2009) in appendix A), I still believe that dynamic capabilities would be 
the most suitable framework for this thesis. Following Helfat and Peteraf (2009), 
dynamic capabilities can complement the change management which lacks 
strategic elements in its analysis.  The integrative nature of dynamic capabilities 
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addresses the issues of strategic change,9 external environments (competition and 
institutions) and internal structure (processes, active role of managers and 
entrepreneurial management).  Additionally, the focus of internal process and 
microfoundations of dynamic capabilities is suitable to examine the evolution of 
working practices of the Chinese businesses. Finally, the micro level explanation of 
dynamic capabilities can supplement the previous macro study of the 
transformation of the Thai retail industry by showing how the Thai-Chinese 
retailers manage to survive in the intense competition. 
In summary, this chapter discussed the key features and trends of the Chinese 
businesses which are the key economic agents in Asia.  The dynamic capabilities 
approach was proposed to provide a framework to explain how firms adjust 
themselves to sustain competitiveness in the changing ecosystem. Finally, the 
research questions were elaborated. 
                                                 
9
 Strategic change involves long term issues that could potentially affect the success and failure of 
the firm (Agarwal and Helfat 2009:281). 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter describes the research design by discussing comparative case studies 
(section 3.1) and research procedures (section 3.2). 
3.1 Comparative Case Studies 
Researchers suggested that inductive and grounded theory research would provide 
findings with internal and external validity for the topic of Chinese management 
and changes in globalised economy (Tsui and Lau 2002).  Thus, I adopted an 
inductive approach to examine the transformation process of Thai-Chinese 
organisations. This study used the comparative case study method (Yin 2009) to 
analyse the dynamic capabilities of two Thai-Chinese retailers.  The main unit of 
analysis is Chinese family businesses and the unit of collecting data is dynamic 
capabilities, microfoundations and the Chinese features of the two firms.  
I chose to study two Thai-Chinese retailers in the North-eastern region of Thailand.  
The first case is “Eternity” --a Thai-Chinese family business selling groceries-- and 
the second case is “Fortune” --a Thai-Chinese retailer selling home building 
products. The business owners of these two cases are first cousins. Eternity is now 
in the third generation whereas Fortune is in the first generation. Both stores are 
considered national leading retailers.10  Eternity’s sale revenue was 1.6 billion baht 
whereas Fortune’s sale revenue was around 4.5 billion baht. 
                                                 
10
 The leading local retailers in Thailand are normally operating in the upcountry because foreign 
retailers chose to invest in the capital city, Bangkok, first before expanding to other provinces.  
Thus, the competition in Bangkok is very intense and only a few local retailers can maintain their 
market shares.  
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The criteria for selecting cases are as follows.  First, the access to information is the 
most crucial factor since this research topic concerns how the owners manage their 
businesses. This information is regarded confidential and the leakage of the 
business information to their competitors might damage their businesses.  I chose 
Eternity because I have an access to a family member of Eternity.  This person 
served as the key informant and helped refer me to the owners of Fortune.  Thus, 
having access and reference helped me get richer data and insight into the 
phenomenon.  This case selection may cause a bias in the analysis; however, I 
addressed this issue by distancing myself from the informants during the analysis 
period.   
Second, I chose the two cases based on their length of business operation, location, 
and types of industry of the firms.  Eternity and Fortune are one of the top five 
retailers in Thailand who command a significant market share.  These two firms 
have grown from a small shophouse into a modern-trade retailer within 30 years of 
operation.  These two firms have also passed through the vicissitude of the Thai 
economy such as the 1997 financial crisis and the deregulation of the service sector 
in the early 2000s.  Further, being in the same province, they are equally exposed 
to the same political factors and local pressures.11 However, different markets 
between grocery and home building products would involve different competition 
contexts (such as institutions, competitors, consumers and suppliers) and might 
                                                 
11
 Kanchoochat (2006) suggested that the competition has been more intense after the rapid 
increase of foreign retailers’ branches in the provincial areas. Some local retailers in these provinces 
utilised networking with local officials and politicians as well as the appeal for localism to compete 
with foreign stores. These two cases would illustrate to what extent these firms utilise political 
networks and localism in their competition. 
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require a different strategy. Hence, the comparison between the two cases would 
highlight the impact of these factors. 
Third, given that the two cases are relatives from the same family,12 I hoped to 
understand the Chinese values of the family and how they are transferred from one 
generation to another.  It might elucidate the factors (e.g. leadership, parenting 
style, value of sons and daughters) that affect their corporate and family 
governance.  Furthermore, these firms are run by different generations so it might 
provide insights into the varying levels of Chinese influence in each generation.  
Finally, since these two cases have a very close relationship, I could triangulate my 
data between the two cases.  I could ask the informants to give opinions about their 
relative’s motives and moves. This provided richer data and validated my data 
collection and interpretation. 
As these two firms are prominent retailers in Thailand, their confidentiality could 
be compromised since there are a few national players who operate in the 
Northeastern region.  Consequently, in this thesis, I did not provide the name of the 
province because people in Thailand could recognise who they are quite easily 
from the name of the province. Furthermore, I used pseudonyms for the two 
retailers, local rivals, and all informants. As my research objective did not aim to 
study these two businesses per se, and I aspired to gain insights from the cases to 
understand overseas Chinese businesses, the withheld names will not affect the 
analysis.  
                                                 
12
 The Lee family owns Eternity business.  The youngest daughter of the Lee family married into 
the Koh Family and later on set up a new business, Fortune.   See the detail in chapter 4. 
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3.2 Research Procedures 
Methods for collecting data 
I combined the theoretical-led and grounded theory approaches for my data 
collection.  The theory and concepts on Chinese management, competitiveness 
analysis and dynamic capabilities provided the framework for collecting data.  
However, I also used the grounded theory approach by letting the informants freely 
discuss issues, such as gender and conflicts, which are not directly related to my 
initial literature review.  I found the combined method useful and it gave me a 
better picture of how the retailers do business. 
My fieldwork was conducted from May 2009 to July 2009 in the city centre of the 
province13 where Eternity and Fortune are located.  As the firms are not listed in 
the stock exchange, the official information about them, such as trade documents, 
is limited.  Hence, various data collection methods are used. 
Interviews  
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted.  The purpose of the interview 
is to understand the change in competitive structure of the retail sector in the 
province during the past 20 years and the impacts on their businesses.  
Furthermore, I explored their strategies and operations in each phase of their 
                                                 
13
 This province has a population of more than 1 million people.  Thailand has 76 provinces with a 
population of 70 million.). 
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organisation.  Finally, I investigated their relationships with external parties (such 
as customers, suppliers, local government officials).   
Trust building was important in this project because the leakage of their business 
data could damage their businesses.  I followed the DERC protocols by asking an 
informed consent before conducting interviews and observing their store settings.  
Since the interviews involved disclosure of confidential business information, some 
informants might feel threatened to openly discuss such matters with me.  Thus, in 
the first meeting, I provided personal and research information (Thai national 
identification card, NUS student card, and a short C.V. in Thai) and clearly 
explained the purpose, analysis framework and assurance of confidentiality to 
establish trust.  The interviews were conducted in a private meeting room at the 
stores.  The personal information was removed from transcripts. Table 3.1 
summarises the data sources, rationale of the interview, and number of 



















Table 3-11: Data sources and objectives of the interviews 
Data sources Data Rationale Number of 
interviewees 









• Competition context, 
strategy, and 
management; their role 
in organisation. 
• Business practices that 
have been preserved 
and changed;  reasons 
and sources of the new 
practices and 
processes; benefits and 
drawbacks of new 
practices 





• To understand the 
retailing competition 
structure and the role of 
business owners. 
• To investigate the 
processes of 
organisational change 
and dynamic capabilities 
from the entrepreneurs’ 
perspective.    
                                                         
• To explore how business 
owners manage 
relationships and use 






• Working processes; 
their responsibilities 
• New and old business 




• To understand the 
processes of 
organisational change 
and dynamic capabilities 







• Working processes; 
business practices that 
have been changed; 
nature of relationship 
with the retailer 
• To get information about 
the retailers’ changes 
from business partner’s 
perspective.   
3 3 
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Data sources Data Rationale Number of 
samples for 




the case 2: 
Fortune 
4. Customers  • Transaction processes; 
business practices that 
have been changed; 
nature of relationship 
with the retailer. 
To get information about 








activities with the 
Chinese retailers 
 
• To understand the 
relationship between the 
retailers and local 
government officers. 
 
2                                   
(I asked the informants to 
discuss their relationships with 
the two retailers). 
 
The business owners were the main source of data providers.  Some of them 
allowed me to conduct follow-up interview sessions since their story was quite 
long.14 I limited my interviews to at most three sessions per day so that I had time 
in the evening for reviewing the interview notes, looking for probing issues, 
transcribing and coding, as well as writing some observation notes. 
After gaining trust from the entrepreneurs, they discussed with me some sensitive 
issues (feuds and profit sharing) in the family businesses.  The staff were, however, 
relatively concerned about the interview confidentiality and tried to comment only 
the good points about the company.  So, the information from suppliers and 
customers was very useful to cross check the validity of the business owners and 
staff’s accounts. 
                                                 
14
 The list of interviewees and number of interviews is in Appendix B. 
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Observation 
Observation was used to complement the interviews and to cross check whether the 
practices described in the interviews were actually implemented.  
 First, I observed the work processes of the business owners and key staff as well as 
the settings of the stores.  After the first interview session, I requested that the 
respondents provide me with a guided tour of their retail store so that I could 
further observe their work processes and business practices 
Second, I conducted an observation of the activities in the stores.  The business 
owners were informed and asked for permission about this observation beforehand. 
During this observation, I noted the physical settings of the stores (such as 
decoration and product mix) and working processes between staff and customers 
(e.g. checking out and packing processes). 
Third, I observed the stores of foreign and local competitors in order to compare 
the business strategy, practices, product assortments and consumer groups.  Finally, 
I assumed a participant observation role in the ceremony of Eternity’s new branch 
opening to observe the business practices, organisational cultures, family cultures 
and the combination of Chinese and Buddhist values in the ceremony.   Also, I 
joined the internal training of employees to note the pressing issues, interaction in 
the meeting and leadership style. 
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Documentary analysis 
I collected public and trade publications to analyse the changes, competition 
structure and the market trend in the retail sector.  For the academic data, past 
theses (in Thai) and journals from the local universities in Bangkok were consulted. 
Clippings about my two case studies were rare and mostly found in the regional 
business news section, even though both companies are leading retailers in 
Thailand.   
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4. Globalisation of Retailing and the Thai Retail Industry  
To provide the context of the evolution of the Thai-Chinese retailers and their 
dynamic capabilities, this chapter discusses the retail revolution (section 4.1), the 
internationalisation of retailing (section 4.2) and the impact and changes in the Thai 
retail industry, especially the grocery and home building material sectors over the 
past 20 years (section 4.3). 
4.1 Retail revolution  
In the past 50 years, according to Hamilton and Petrovic (2011), the world has 
witnessed the “revolution of retailing.”  This transformation originated in the U.S. 
retail industry and led to the change of practices and relationship between 
suppliers, retailers and customers.  The changes in the retail landscape also have 
had far reaching effects on the international trade, consumer goods in global 
markets and development of the world economy.  During this period, there are five 
major trends of the revolution of retailing: 
1. Large retailers from the U.S., Europe and Japan, such as Walmart, Carrefour, 
Home Depot and Aeon, have risen to dominate the global retail markets.  This was 
due to the invention of innovative retailing solutions (e.g. self-service, broad 
product mix and chain store concept) in the late 1950s. These formats were applied 
in various sectors ranging from groceries to hardware and were diffused to 
European and Japanese markets. The retailing innovations resulted in the dramatic 
growth of the large retailers in these economies.   
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2. The boundaries of manufacturers, brand-name merchandisers, and retailers have 
overlapped and most of them moved to focus on marketing capability and sourcing 
products from contract manufacturers.  This trend began in the clothing industry in 
early 1970s (Nike and Ralph Lauren) and spread to consumer electronics (Dell and 
IBM). 
3. The retailers utilised advanced information technology such as Universal 
Product Code and barcode systems to improve efficiency in sales and inventory 
management in the mid 1970- 1980s.  This resulted in “lean retailing” systems 
which allowed the retailers to better manage their supply chain and cost of goods 
sold in their stores.  At the same time, suppliers and logistic providers gathered as a 
network to provide products and services for the leading retailers. 
4. Since the late 1970s, U.S. and European retailers increasingly sourced their 
products from East Asia.  The availability of cheap import products increased the 
negotiation power of retailers whilst deteriorated the competitiveness of local 
manufacturers. 
5. The consumption pattern has been transformed by the global retailers.  These 
retailers offer standardised products to answer the need of customers in each 
market.  The customers consume the products based on their lifestyle, income and 
identities.  This consumption information then feeds back to the retailers.  In this 
demand-driven retailing process, the convergence and the differentiation of 
consumption patterns arose at the same time (e.g. the spread of McDonald’s food 
v.s. the differentiation of McDonald’s menus in Asia).  It generated new types of 
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customers and offered opportunities for retailers to devise suitable products and 
services for that market. 
In the retail revolution process, large retailers functioned as “market makers” for 
both consumers and suppliers’ side (Hamilton and Petrovic 2011; Hamilton, 
Petrovic, and Feenstra 2006:149, 181).  Their sales activities, such as targeting 
customer groups, locating the stores, selecting assortment of products, and 
advertising sales promotions, created markets for final goods and shaped the 
behaviours of customers.  Concurrently, giant retailers have the power to choose 
which manufacturers provide the most suitable intermediate and primary goods for 
their stores. 
The revolution of retail has had several impacts (Hamilton and Petrovic 2011).  
First, the competition in the global retail market has intensified.  The market share 
of small and traditional retailers has become threatened by large retailing 
companies.  Second, big retailing businesses have gained increasing negotiating 
powers and have become able to demand various forms of concessions (e.g. direct 
price discounts and rebate) from suppliers. Third, the adoption of technology such 
as barcodes and electronic data interchange has increased the productivity of both 
participating suppliers and the overall economy. Fourth, retailers have become 
major employers who have absorbed the large labour force that has migrated from 
manufacturing work in the developed economies.  However, most retailing jobs 
require low skilled workers and the pay is low. Finally, modern retailers have 
provided standardised products and services, and formats of stores for customers.  
The transformation of retailing has also lead to the growth of suppliers markets 
(especially in East Asia) and consumers markets in the global economy. 
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Compared with financial and industrial markets, retail markets are less globalised 
and consolidated (Hamilton and Petrovic 2011). However, the retail revolution 
resulted in “the age of global retailers” where standards of retail formats became 
diffuse.  These actors are “marketising the world economy” by restructuring global 
supply chains and attracting new customers to participate in modern economies. 
The large retailers have grown very fast over the past few decades because of their 
internationalisation activities. 
4.2 The internationalisation of retailing 
The internationalisation of retailing seems to be a unique process in the modern 
economy.  In fact, this process can be traced back to the 14th century where 
merchants travelled to new places and diffused managerial innovations in trading 
ventures  (Dawson 2003:2). However, the scope and impacts on global economy of 
the internationalisation of retail at that time are unmatched with the currently 
unfolding process. 
The main feature of the internationalisation of retailing nowadays is the spread of 
the U.S. retailing formats (e.g. supermarkets, chain stores, big box stores, and 
shopping malls) to various parts of the world. The U.S. formats were diffused to 
the global retail markets in four phases (Petrovic 2011). 
1. 1900-1945: This period is marked as the limited internationalisation.  The 
American retailing methods (mainly the department stores) were adopted in many 
countries through emulation and direct investment of the American entrepreneurs. 
Small “limited price” chain stores were also popular in the U.K. and Continental 
Europe. 
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2. 1945-1970:  The big box stores were introduced to Europe and Japan via the 
U.S. aid efforts to strengthen the economy of allied countries during the Cold War.  
Supermarkets and self-service concepts were gradually embraced by these markets. 
The pricing, store size and product mix were, nevertheless, adjusted to suit the 
local contexts and led to new types of stores such as hypermarkets (France) and 
hard discount stores (Germany). Shopping centres were supported by local 
governments and investors to boost the economy.  The U.S. retailers still focused 
on thriving domestic markets whereas the European counterparts were not strong 
enough to expand their businesses abroad. 
3. 1970-1990: The internationalisation of retailing increased rapidly. The most 
successful foreign expansion of U.S. retailers were the franchises of fast food 
operators (KFC and McDonald’s), convenience stores (7-11) and car rentals. 
Unlike the U.S. retailers, European retailers actively invested in the U.S., Latin 
America and East Asia due to the restrictive regulations, competition and market 
size in their own countries (Wortmann 2011).  Fashion retailers and specialty stores 
(e.g. Benetton and IKEA) also opened outlets in the international markets.  During 
this period, some large retail chain stores in the U.S., U.K. and Germany managed 
to consolidate the retail business in their countries. 
4. 1990 -2010: The U.S. retail formats were disseminated in the developing 
economies through the global expansion of European and Japanese retailers. In the 
past decade, shopping malls, convenience stores, supermarkets and internet-based 
retailers have emerged in the emerging markets.  However, giant retailers have 
mainly invested in their home regions.  For instance, European retailers have 
invested heavily in the east European countries.  It is still difficult to establish a 
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truly global retailer because of complex markets, diverse customer tastes, and 
varying regulation regimes.   
The future trend is the increase in foreign investments by large retailers in various 
consumer products (including home products, toys, books, and electronics).  
Further, innovations from leading retailers would converge where the U.S. formats 
would no longer be the single dominating model. 
4.3 Thai retail industry    
Thailand is another case that has been directly affected by the internationalisation 
of retailing. Over the last two decades, large retailers such as Tesco (U.K.), 
Carrefour (France), Casino (France), Aeon (Japan) and SHV (the Netherlands) 
have seen opportunities in the Thai retailing sector where the retail regulation was 
weak and modern trade penetration was still low (McCombs School of Business 
n.d.). These operators aggressively expanded their businesses after the 1997 
financial crisis. The proportion of modern trade increased to more than 50% in 
2009 (Shannon 2009). The restructuring of the Thai retail industry happened in a 
very short period compared with those of the U.S. and European countries which 
took around 50-80 years (Reardon and Hopkins 2006).   
The retail landscape between World War II and 1990 
During this period, the Thai retail sector was dominated by traditional trade; only 
some forms of modern trade such as department stores and supermarkets existed in 
greater Bangkok (Feeny and Vongpatanasin 1996).  The first department store --
Central-- was established in1956, after which, the number of department stores 
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steadily increased.15  Most supermarkets were initially opened in department stores 
but the penetration rate was still low compared with wet markets (ibid).  Specialty 
stores such as Makro office16 and Tower Records were set up in a small format 
located inside the department stores.   In 1989, convenience stores (Seven-Eleven) 
and cash and carry stores (Makro) were introduced by Thai operators and the joint 
venture companies.  Their branches were only in the Bangkok area. Thai customers 
went shopping for leisure during the weekends. Some department stores 
differentiated themselves by establishing entertainment complexes (e.g. fun parks, 
cinemas and zoos) to attract customers (ibid; Shannon and Mandhachitara 2005). 
Regarding retail in the country, shophouses were the typical format.  There were 
some department stores operated by local capital and joint ventures between local 
and Bangkok-based capital (Feeny and Vongpatanasin 1996). 
The dynamic retail landscape between 1990 and 2010 
During this period, modern trade has become a major sector of the retail industry.  
In 2007, the number of modern trade stores reached 6,000 with revenues of 1.4 
trillion baht (BrandAge’s Editorial staff 2008; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004). 
New types of modern trade (e.g. hypermarkets and category killers; see table 2.1) 
were introduced in this period. The competition between hypermarkets and 
supermarkets has intensified due to the advent of large foreign retailers.   
                                                 
15
 Department stores reached the saturation point in the mid-1990s where there were more than 50 
stores catering for 8 million people in Bangkok. 
16
 In 2008, Makro sold the Makro Office unit to Central Retail Corporation which operates Office 
Depot. 
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In the early 1990s, Thai operators and foreign retailers set up hypermarkets after 
the success of the Makro cash and carry stores.  For example, Big C (Casino 
group), Tesco and Carrefour opened their first stores in 1993, 1994 and 1996 
respectively.  Given the weakness of local capital after the 1997 financial crisis, the 
Thai operators sold the retailing business to the foreign partners to focus on their 
core businesses.  The Thai government needed to attract foreign investors to 
revitalise the economy.  The Foreign Business Act 1999 was passed to allow 
foreigners to invest in the retail sector.  The investment capital needed, however, 
was in excess of 100 million baht and 20 million baht per outlets for retail 
businesses whilst for the wholesale was 100 million baht per outlet 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004; Sangchai 2001). Table 4.1 shows the leading 
retailers in each category of modern trade in Thailand. 
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Source: Adapted from Shannon (2009, table 1:81) and company websites. 
 
Grocery 
Groceries used to be distributed through traditional trade: wholesalers, distributors 
and shop house stores.  Since 1990, the sale of groceries through modern trade 
                                                 
17
The number of department stores and category killers is 2003 data of PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2004)’s study and 2010 data from company websites. 
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channels (convenience stores, supermarkets and hypermarkets) has grown 
dramatically.18  
After the 1997 crisis, foreign retailers have aggressively expanded their businesses 
throughout Thailand. From figure 4.1, Carrefour, Big C and Tesco had a total of 18 
branches in 1996, which by 2009 had risen to 230 branches. The strength of these 
foreign retailers lies in advanced technologies and efficient logistics systems.  They 
also used both price and non-price strategies to be competitive. Non-price 
strategies were new to the Thai retail sector such as launching private label 
products to attract price-conscious clients; charging suppliers for handling fees 
(entrance fee, rebate, advertisement supporting fee, and special events fee); and  
















































      Source: Press report and company websites 
                                                 
18
 In countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Greece, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand, 
food sales through supermarkets and hypermarkets increased from 10-20 percent to more than 50 
percent (Petrovic 2011). 
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Figure 4-11: The number of stores of Carrefour, Big C and Tesco from 1996 – 
2009 
 
The intense competition led to the demise of many traditional retailers.  Some local 
retailers complained about unfair competition from foreign operators and invoked 
economic nationalism to fight foreign retailers.  Due to the economic downfall, the 
customers, however, became price-sensitive and began to get used to the new 
shopping experience provided by modern trade retailers (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2004). 
The Thai retail regulation was relatively weak. The government tried to limit the 
negative effects on small and medium retailers by using stricter legislations.  The 
Retail Act was drafted in 2002, but it has not been passed due to lobbying and 
political turmoil in Thailand.  Meanwhile, other laws, such as Trade Competition 
Act 1999 and the Building Control Act 1979, were applied to prevent the anti-
competition practices operated by the foreign retailers (ibid). 
Trend 
Given the pressure of traditional trade operators and the new Retail Act, foreign 
retailers built smaller-sized stores to reduce the investment costs and to easily 
embed themselves in local communities (ibid; Rujikajorn and Sintuwatin 2008). 
Some stores adopted customer relationship management systems e.g. using 
membership cards to collect purchasing data and to create individual sales 
promotions (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004).  Some hypermarket operators aimed 
to improve store images and create differentiation.  For instance, Tesco introduced 
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a more expensive clothes line to create a premium image.  Big C planned to attract 
more and younger shoppers by creating an entertainment complex as well as a 
variety of plazas and stores (Shannon 2009; Big C: Annual Report 2009).  
Moreover, foreign retailers established alliances with suppliers and banks to launch 
special sale events throughout the year. 
In the past, hypermarkets mainly focused on low to medium income customers 
whereas department stores and specialty stores targeted medium to high income 
groups.  Currently, hypermarkets aim to attract more medium income groups by 
offering products such as electronics and appliances normally sold in the 
department stores or category killer stores.  This has resulted in a blurring of the 
boundaries of target customers and price competitions between these stores. (ARIP 
IT News 2010; c.f. Petrovic 2011 for the competition of retailing formats) 
The shrinking numbers of traditional retailers has resulted in fewer customers for 
cash and carry operators (Makro) and traditional wholesalers (Shannon 2009:87).  
Thus, in this period these players have launched campaigns to strengthen their 
network of mom and pop shops.  Some local distributors and wholesalers have also 
adopted modern trade formats and created networks of stores to preserve their sales 
volumes (Shannon 2008). 
Home building materials19  
The modern trade trend in “hard goods” such as books, electronics and home 
building products has followed the trend observed in grocery products. Over the 
                                                 
19
 This category includes retailers who operate DIY stores, hardware stores, home centres, home 
decoration stores, and construction materials stores. 
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past 20 years, this sector has moved towards the modern trade format. The home 
improvement market in 2007 totalled 132 billion baht, but 75% of this value was 
still in traditional trade (Rujikajorn and Sintuwatin 2008).   The modern stores have 
had a competitive advantage over traditional stores due to convenience and the 
availability of products in the large warehouses.  Customers could browse, compare 
the specification and get additional information from staff.  The store provides 
convenient shopping experiences ranging from convenient car parking to 
competitive prices.  
Even though there is no foreign player in this market, local operators have 
transformed themselves into category killers or big box stores (focusing on home 
centres, hardware and home building materials).  These players have been 
expanding their businesses around the country over the past five years. Table 4.2 
shows the key operators of this market. 
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Table 4-2: Operators in the home building materials that operate as a modern trade store 






Home Pro Home centre and 
DIY 
final customers Bangkok 35 
Homework Home centre and 
DIY 







































HomeMart  Dealers for home 
building materials 
of Siam Cement 
Group 
Contractors, retailers 
and final customers 
Bangkok and 
provincial 
















Décor Mart Home Decoration 
store 
Final customers and 
contractors 
Bangkok 3 
BoonThavorn Tiles, kitchen and 
bathroom 







Final customers Bangkok 17 
Source: Company websites, trade documents and (Office of the SME promotion 2007) 
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The strategy of these modern trade operators has been to create chain stores in key 
provinces.  These have increased their negotiating power with suppliers and 
increased customer bases.  Some operators also expanded their product offerings to 
create a one-stop service.  For instance, Global House and DoHome whose strength 
was in home building materials and hardware began to sell more home decoration 
products.  Central Retail Corporation who operates Homework --an upscale home 
decoration and DIY store-- set up a new store, Thai Watsadu, in 2010 to focus on 
construction materials and hardware products. SCG group (a top construction 
materials conglomerate) set up SCG Experience, the first centre of information and 
modern technology for housing, as a new high-end channel for its retail business.  
Furthermore, SCG just launched a new strategy to convert its HomeMart dealers 
into a HomeSolution Centre to meet the changing customer habits in this market 
(Wiriyapong 2010).   
Some players, such as HomePro and Global House, have tried to differentiate by 
selling private-label products. Moreover, special events with suppliers and financial 
institutions, and real estate developers are utilised to attract customers.  These large 
home building materials companies, regarded as a threat to local community and 
traditional stores, have placed greater emphasis on the corporate social 
responsibility to gain legitimacy from local people.  
The modern trade’s effect on local traditional stores is similar to the grocery sector. 
Some of the small to medium sized wholesalers and retailers have fewer customers 
and profits.  Some traditional stores have adopted the modern trade format and 
expanded their business.  For example, the Blue Building group in Nakornsawan 
province set up a modern trade store “Homex” in 2006 with an area of over 20,000 
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square metres in the province (Rujikajorn and Sintuwatin 2008).  The stores that 
cannot compete with these centres turn themselves into an exclusive or dealer store 
for the major suppliers. 
Trend 
The competition in the home building materials sector has become even more 
intense.  IKEA has a joint venture with its long-time business partner in Thailand to 
create the first IKEA store in a power mall near Suvarnabhumi airport.  Given the 
new Retail Act, leading stores are looking for prime areas out of town to create big 
box stores. Since there is no clear leader in this sector, every operator has 
accelerated the expansion of their branches in strategic regions (ibid; Office of the 
SME promotion 2007).   Due to the economic downturn, careful expansion 
planning is necessary; some companies have used the stock market to finance their 
expansion.  Some family businesses still rely on their capital and banks in order to 
keep the management power in the family. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the globalisation of retailing that 
originated from the U.S. retailers and the impacts of both at the national level (Thai 
retailing sector) and the industry level (grocery and home building materials 
retailing). In the following chapter, the background of the two case studies will be 
discussed in the context of the globalisation of retailing and the changing 
competitive arena in the Thai retail sector.  
 
  61
5. Case Studies: Background 
In this chapter, I describe the key developments of Eternity (section 5.1) and 
Fortune (section 5.2) in each period by looking at business focus, competition 
structure, business strategy and organisational management.   
5.1 Eternity  
Eternity is a leading retailer in Thailand.  Its revenue in 2009 was over 1.6 billion 
baht and it is a top five local retailer in Thailand.  It owns a large wholesale store 
and a network of 15 convenience stores (under the name “GreatPrice”) in a major 
province of northeastern Thailand.  Eternity is now in the third generation.  The 
owner of this business is the Chinese (Teochew) family “Lee” with a Thai surname 



















1st Gen. 2nd Gen. 3rd Gen. 4th Gen.
 
Figure 5-11: Family tree of the Lee family, the owner of Eternity 
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The company originated as a small retail store in 1946.  Eternity’s business can be 
classified into three generations.  In the first two generations, the firm was led by 
female family members.  In the first generation (1946-1992), it was Norah, who 
controlled the business while her husband, Ken, managed the back office and 
accounting.  In the second generation (1992-2002), the eldest son of Norah, Paul, 
let his wife, Jasmine, manage the store.  Paul started and focused on real estate and 
loan businesses.  In the third generation (2002 – present), the current managing 
director (CEO) is the eldest son, Alan.  The chief operating officer is the second 
son, Brian.  Cecilia, the youngest daughter, is the chief financial officer.  Jasmine 
transferred the management role to her children in 2006 and remained only in an 
advisory role in the company. 
1946 1992 2002
1st Gen 2nd Gen 3rd Gen
• Shophouse retailer • Shopping mall






Figure 5-22: Timeline of Eternity's business 
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The first generation (1946 – 1992): shophouse retailer 
Norah and Ken opened a retail store selling plastic wares, kitchen wares, bed wares 
and bed nets in the main market area of the province.  Norah was the main seller 
and purchaser.  She travelled alone by train to Bangkok and placed orders with 
suppliers.  Her husband --Ken-- was born in China and migrated to Thailand during 
World War II. Not able to speak Thai fluently, he helped Norah with accounting 
and operation of the store. 
The focus of Eternity in this generation was to trade with both wholesale and retail 
customers by means of credit and cash accounts.  Most credit customers were 
mom-and-pop shops in the nearby provinces.  In this period, the financial situation 
of Eternity was very limited.  Norah and Ken had to raise 11 children (six of her 
own and five of Ken’s first Chinese wife).  Thus, her six children could not attend 
secondary school in order to help Norah with the store.  Moreover, despite 
managing to raise some money, the store burned down along with neighbouring 
businesses on two occasions.  However, Norah fought on and her business started 
to grow in the 1970s. 
Competition 
The competition in this period was from neighbouring shops in the market.  Most 
shops were mainly operated by Chinese selling similar products.  The big players 
with capital and good reputations (such as HCH) would serve as the main 
distributor of many products from Bangkok. Eternity had to ask for a credit account 
from these stores and suppliers in Bangkok.  The profit margin that Eternity 
generated was marginal.   
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Strategy 
Eternity was a small player at first and grew slowly to become a leading player at 
the end of first generation.  The strategy that Norah used was to create 
interpersonal relationships.  This helped establish trust with suppliers and 
customers.  Eternity could not afford to pay suppliers up front for products. Norah 
asked for favours to open credit accounts from suppliers.  The suppliers would give 
her 30-60 days to settle the credit account. 
For customers, she used hospitality and service to create loyal customers such as 
offering drinks and taking care of their belongings while they went to buy other 
products.  Furthermore, Eternity managed to give credit accounts to some good 
customers.   
Management and Organisation 
In this period, Norah used family business management.  Every family member had 
a role in the business.  For instance, Paul, the eldest son, was responsible for 
collecting money and delivering products to credit customers in the nearby 
province.  Tanya, the youngest daughter, helped her mother with selling and 
accounting and became the right-hand person of her mother at the end of the first 
generation. The staff worked and stayed at the shophouse.  They would take care of 
raising the small children of the family. The store opened from Monday to 
Saturday and had a long vacation during the Chinese New Year.   
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The second generation (1992 – 2002): shopping mall 
In 1992, Norah transferred the management power and family money (gongsi 
money), to her eldest son, Paul, and spent time taking care of her ailing husband.  
Some gongsi money was divided and distributed to Norah’s children to start their 
own business (e.g. bricks, glass and printing companies).  It was Jasmine20, the 
wife of Paul, who led the Eternity business.  Paul focused on the real estate and 
loan businesses. 
The generation of Jasmine can be divided into two phases: (1) Period with a few 
local competitors (1992-1996) and (2) Period with foreign competitors (1996-
2002). 
The second generation: phase 1 (1992 -1996) 
This phase is considered the golden period of Eternity. Eternity changed from a 
traditional shophouse retailer into the first shopping mall21 in the province in 1992.  
In 1994, Jasmine started a chain of franchised convenience stores, called “All 
Day”, by converting her unused estates into convenience stores. Jasmine saw this 
opportunity when visiting shopping malls in Bangkok.  She became confident that 
her province was ready for this type of store when her sister-in law (eldest daughter 
                                                 
20
 Jasmine came from a merchant (grocery business) family in a neighbouring province.               
She married Paul in 1974. 
 
21
 “Eternity Shopping mall” is the name of the store. In fact, it was a department store with a 
supermarket in a five-storey building and an underground car park.  It is not a US “mall” format. 
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of Norah) opened a successful shopping mall and franchised convenience stores in 
another province.   
The shopping mall was built as a modern five-storey building with a car park. 
Eternity could open the shopping mall and operate very efficiently with the help of 
this sister-in law.  The sister-in law sent her staff to train Eternity’s employees and 
introduced bar-code technology to Jasmine. After the opening of the Eternity 
shopping mall, customers flocked to the mall, increasing the profit dramatically. 
Competition 
During this time, there was no direct competitor in the shopping mall and 
supermarket segment in the province because the other shopping malls operated as 
specialty stores and focused on some groups of products (e.g. cosmetics and 
clothing) only. Eternity’s strength was the supermarket that provided reasonable 
prices with a variety of products.  Eternity outgrew the HCH (a key distributor in 
the first generation whom Eternity had negotiated products and credit accounts 
from) because HCH still focused on the traditional distributor business.   
Eternity’s new shopping mall had a very good reputation which drew both new and 
old customers to the store.  The turnover of products was high.  This business 
success was partly because the Thai economy was in a boom period (early 1990s) 
where the consumer demand grew consistently.  Eternity won many sale awards as 
a leading national store from suppliers.  More suppliers came to Jasmine to give 
sample products in the hope of securing orders from her.  For customers, Jasmine 
served both cash and credit customers.   
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Strategy 
In this first phase, the strategy was to provide a wide variety of products at a 
reasonable price and to offer a new shopping experience (from shopping malls to 
convenience stores) to local customers.  The bargaining power of Eternity with 
suppliers increased due to its reputation.  While expanding the revenue channels, 
Jasmine also attempted to modernise the operations.  The barcode system, point of 
sale program, and accounting software were used to increase efficiency and provide 
a better service for customers.   Eternity became a leading store in the province and 
Jasmine was invited to join provincial ceremonies and business forums.  Eternity 
started to contribute to local charity works. 
Management and Organisation 
The management changed from a family business into a modern firm.  Eternity was 
incorporated as a company and all family members were registered as shareholders.  
However, only Jasmine worked for the company as the managing director because 
her children were studying. The organisation structure was set up.  Old and 
trustworthy staff were promoted to the heads of departments (e.g. HR, accounting, 
and purchasing).   
 
The second generation: phase 2 (1996- 2002). 
The focus of the business of Eternity was still the same as in the first phase.  This 
period, however, witnessed an increase in competition in the province because 
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Makro, an international cash and carry store, opened a new branch in 1996 
followed by Tesco and Big-C in 2001.  
During the first three months following Makro’s opening, Eternity’s sales dropped 
by 20% because some customers tried to shop at Makro.  Fortunately, for Eternity, 
the policy of Makro did not match with local customers’ needs.  For example, 
access to the store was reserved to member cardholders of Makro only.  Product 
offerings were limited and many were housebrands. Moreover, customers were 
required to pack and load the purchased goods themselves.  Hence, within a year, 
Eternity’s sale returned to their previous levels.   
Eternity faced a major cash flow problem during the financial crisis in 1997.  The 
real estate business of Paul lost a fortune from this crisis.  Eternity was also 
affected because Paul and Jasmine kept their money in one family account.  They 
solved the cash flow issue by splitting the account and borrowed money from their 
sister, Tanya, the owner of Fortune.   
Then, Jasmine managed to run the business throughout the bad economic situation.  
The profits were not as high as before.  The profits dropped again after Tesco and 
Big C opened in 2001.  The commercial area of the province began to shift to the 
area where these foreign stores are located.  The old market area of Eternity was 
regarded as “outdated” and inconvenient due to limited parking space.   Jasmine 
wanted to expand the store because the size was too small compared with the 
foreign stores, but she had limited capital and the children were still studying. 
  69
Competition  
Eternity had to compete with Makro, Big C and Tesco. The foreign retailers had an 
advantage through their modern images, new format of stores which were air-
conditioned and provided plenty of parking spaces.  They also used advertisement 
in newspapers, radio and television.  The bargaining power of Eternity decreased 
because suppliers gave special deals to the foreign stores.  Suppliers claimed that 
such practices were high-level policies between their companies and foreign 
retailers. 
Strategy  
Jasmine tried to improve the organisation and operation.  New professional 
managers were hired.  They had experience working with Makro and leading 
retailers in Bangkok.  These managers helped set up new systems such as mail 
order, customer membership and IT systems.  However, these managers did not 
stay on due to conflicts with Eternity’s family members.  Jasmine also sought help 
from multinational suppliers to train her staff how to use just-in-time stock 
management. 
Management and Organisation 
The management style was similar to the first phase.  Jasmine still ran the business 
by herself with the support of some loyal staff.  By this time, her three children 
were studying for their undergraduate degrees. 
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The third generation: (2002 – present): modern trade store 
During this period, Jasmine’s children – Allan, Brian, Cecilia – all finished their 
degrees22.  They all agreed to come back and run their family business. They 
managed to turn around their business within a few years by opening a new 
wholesale store in 2002 and a network of modern convenience stores –
“GreatPrice”23 in 2006.  Eternity revenue grew from 800 million baht in the 2nd 
generation to 1,600 million baht nowadays. 
In 2002, Jasmine and her children realised the changing trend of customers 
shopping preferences and the limitation of their old location.  They searched for the 
model wholesale store by visiting various foreign competitors’ branches.   
Moreover, Eternity planned to have an air-conditioned system for their new store. 
Eternity discussed with engineers about the options for the store’s cooling system.  
They found the evaporation system being used in textile factories and chicken 
farming industries was a suitable solution.  Although it was not as cool as the 
conventional air-conditioned system, the evaporation system provides a cool 
atmosphere for a fraction of the electricity cost. Hence, Eternity became the first 
retailer to use this cooling system.24 
                                                 
22
 Allan, Brian and Cecilia obtained their tertiary degrees in Bangkok. Allan and Cecilia undertook 
further studies in the UK and China. 
23
 The franchised contract of “All Day” was not renewed.  Eternity converted these stores under 
their new brand “GreatPrice”. 
24
 Fortune also used this system.  The owners of Fortune and Eternity travelled together to visit the 




Apart from three foreign retailers, Eternity had to compete with new local retailers 
such as BonMart who adopted the same strategy by building a large modern 
wholesale store.  The local players tended to use price competition whereas foreign 
stores used both cheap house brand products and promotion strategies to attract 
their customers. 
Strategy 
The strategy of Eternity was to create growth by generating constant revenues from 
wholesale and convenience stores.  The increase in the number of convenience 
stores was aimed to contain the invasion of foreign retailers (such as Tesco 
express) into the mid-size discount convenience store market.  Furthermore, 
Eternity tried to professionalise its operation system by implementing a new 
accounting and enterprise resource planning system in order to make the working 
process more efficient and to control the operational costs. Eternity also tried to 
appeal to the localism by creating a motto such as “local store for local people” and 
supporting various local charitable projects. 
Management and Organisation 
Jasmine served as the managing director until 2006.  Along the way, her children 
learned from old staff and were given more power in the business.  In 2006, 
Eternity introduced corporate governance to replace the traditional gongsi system 
partly due to conflicts arising between the two sons.  Jasmine, her children and 
daughter in-law are directors on the board of directors.  Allan, the eldest son is the 
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CEO and takes care of marketing and convenience stores.  Brian, the second son, 
takes care of purchasing and the wholesale centre.  Celilia, the youngest daughter, 
is responsible for finance and accounting.  Jasmine assumes an advising role and 
runs a small local product shop at the wholesale centre.  
The management style began to change from a Chinese family business 
management towards a professional firm.  Allan introduced western management 
ideas such as vision, mission and strategy and performance evaluation.  Decision 
making was delegated to the head of the units.  Meetings and documentation were 
used.  The double bookkeeping practice was abolished.  Employees had a formal 
uniform.  The HR department set detailed rules and regulations for the employees 
based on the guidelines of the government. IT systems were used in most units.  
However, family members still had discretionary powers with regard to following 
the rules.  The relationship with suppliers and customers can be guanxi-based and 
professional based.  Since the shopping mall era, Eternity operates every day 
except during Thai New Year in April. 
5.2 Fortune   
Fortune is a national leading retailer in the home building materials sector.  Its 
revenue in 2009 reached 4.5 billion baht.  It has four branches (two branches in its 
hometown and two branches in two other major provinces in Thailand).  It serves 
contractors, retailers and final customers.  Fortune sells more than 120,000 items 
ranging from steel, cement, home appliances, sanitary ware, stationary to gifts.  
Currently, Fortune is still in the first generation but is in the process of transferring 
to the second generation. 
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One of the owners is Tanya, the second daughter of Norah of Eternity.  She married 
Eddy of the Koh family in 1981.  The Koh family has a Thai surname 

















Figure 5-33: Family tree of the Koh family 
The Koh family used to trade recycled products.  All three sons of the Koh family 
received tertiary level educations in engineering.  The eldest brother, Arthur, set up 
a paint and home building materials store in 1977 and Eddy and Ted, the younger 
brothers, helped run the business as a gongsi business.  Due to the unfair profit 
sharing, Eddy and Tanya left the family business and gave up the inheritance rights 
in the Koh family.  Eddy and Tanya started another small construction materials 
store in another area of the city centre.  Eddy took care of operation and back 
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office, and finance.  Tanya who had more than 16 years of experience from 
Eternity (as the right hand of her mother, Norah) oversaw selling and purchasing.  
 
Currently, Eddy is the managing director and Tanya is vice managing director.  In 
fact, they share equal responsibility in the firm.  Eddy and Tanya have two grown 
up daughters (Alisa and Sarah) and a teenage son (Henry).  Upon graduating, Alisa 
and Sarah came back from Bangkok to help run the business as a member of the 
board of directors.  Alisa takes care of purchasing and marketing whilst Sarah set 
up and modernised the back office and IT systems.   
Although Fortune has operated since 1983, it is still in the first generation led by 
Eddy and Tanya.  This period can be divided into three phases.  The first phase 
ranges from 1983 – 1994: the setup of the company.  The second phase is from 
1994 to 2003: growth period.   The third phase is from 2003 to present: expansion 
period.  The following section discusses the business, competition, strategy and 
management style in each phase. 
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1983 1994 2003




• Moved to new location
•Expansion period
• Set up new branches
 
Figure 5-4: Timeline of Fortune's business 
The first generation: the first phase: setup (1983 – 1994) 
After departing from the Koh family, Eddy and Tanya opened a retail store selling 
construction materials such as steel, roof tiles, and cement in the city centre.  They 
believed that this business had a future because the profit margin of each product 
was much higher than groceries.  Their store was a small shop house with limited 
capital.  Sometimes Eddy had to borrow money from Tanya’s eldest brother (Paul 
of Eternity) to help with the cash flow.  They had small children and occasionally 
had their neighbours take care of the children while they were working.   
Competition 
The competition in this period was from well-established stores selling the 
construction products in the province (including the paint store of Arthur, the eldest 
brother of the Koh Family).  Each store specialised in their product lines such as 
the construction materials store, the paint store, and the sanitary ware store.  These 
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players would be the dealers of premium brand products and sold products to small 
retailers and end users in the nearby provinces.   
Strategy 
Fortune focused on the contractor group of clients because they were considered 
undesirable and the most risky customers for construction materials stores.  Non-
performing loans frequently occurred.  To meet the contractors’ demands to limit 
the cost of construction, Fortune offered non-premium graded products. Revenue 
from contractors represented 80 percent of their total revenue. 
The second strategy was to be price competitive with other big stores.  Tanya used 
the strategy from consumer products by paying cash to get discount from the 
suppliers and gave some discount to customers.  This technique increased the 
turnover of products and maintained the cash flow.  Moreover, Tanya established 
personal relationships with suppliers and customers and provided good service and 
hospitality.  The personal relationship allowed her to obtain insights and observe 
trends in her business.  
Another strategy was to improve the operation of the business.  Eddy liked to adapt 
new technology to increase the performance of staff.  For instance, in 1988, he 
bought a computer and software to manage the stock and price of products.  The 
use of computers was uncommon for a small shophouse business in that era. 
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Management and Organisation 
Fortune operated as a Chinese family business.  Family members and staff worked 
and ate together in the store.  The decision making was centralised and separated 
between Eddy and Tanya according to their responsibilities. The store opened from 
Monday to Saturday, and had a vacation during the Chinese New Year. 
By the end of the first phase, Fortune had a very good reputation for paying 
suppliers on time and offering a fair price to customers.  
The first generation: the second phase: the growth era (1994 – 2003) 
In 1994, Fortune decided to build a big store in an isolated area adjacent to the city 
centre.  Tanya believed that her business would outgrow the areas over the next 
few years and the parking space and traffic in the city centre would become 
congested.  Her plan was to create a new branch that was convenient and this 
would reduce the operation costs and increase the competitive edge for stocking 
products.  These would bring in more customers and revenues that could pay back 
the bank loan.  She made decisions based on her business experience, insights and 
customers’ complaints about the inconvenience of her old store.  
Bankers and business people doubted Fortune’s decision and predicted that the 
business would fail. However, this move led to the high growth of Fortune and 
turned it into “the” leading retailer in the province who provided convenience and a 
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wide variety of readily available cheap products.25 Thus, many government and 
charitable organisations in the province asked for support from Fortune.  Fortune 
donated a large amount of money to various charities each year. 
Competition 
The competition context phase is quite similar to the first phase. Nevertheless, 
Fortune outgrew all its competitors.  The strength of Fortune lay in the convenience 
of its store location, availability of products in the warehouse, and the cheap prices 
of goods.  Fortune became the price leader to whom competitors needed to 
benchmark their prices against.  
Strategy 
Fortune used the same strategy as in the first phase until the 1997.  Fortune was 
financially affected by this crisis.  Earlier that year, Eddy helped a bank manager to 
borrow foreign money at a low interest rate.  The loan doubled its value due to the 
devaluation of the baht.  During this economic hardship, Fortune faced a cash flow 
problem from the defaults of their contractors.  Tanya solved this problem by 
trying to sell the products in the stock and negotiate with the suppliers to postpone 
the payment deal.  With a good track record on payment and strong relationship 
between them, suppliers agreed to help Fortune.  Eddy and Tanya decided not to 
lay off their staff due to Chinese values (treating the staff as family members).  
                                                 
25
 Like Eternity, the growth of Fortune in this period (1994 -1997) was due partly to the growth in 
the Thai economy.  There were economic bubbles in real estate.  This increased the demand in 
construction materials for the projects in the public and private sectors.   
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Staff reciprocated by voluntarily giving up their perks and taking periods of unpaid 
leave. 
Following this crisis, this proved to be the turning point of Fortune to focus more 
on retail customers.  Fortune expanded the small retail store into a large modern 
trade store.  The revenue from retail buyers increased steadily and business started 
to grow again after a few years. 
Management and Organisation 
The organisation of Fortune became larger and it was arranged by functional units: 
accounting, finance, sale, purchasing and IT.  Rules and regulations were 
introduced.  Old and loyal staff were promoted to heads the various units.  Eddy 
and Tanya still held final decision making responsibilities.  The meeting and 
training were informal.  Everyday Tanya checked the staff’s work and held a staff 
briefing from one unit to another.  External managers could not work for a long 
time due to conflict with old staff and an inability to drive initiatives.   
The first Generation: the third phase: expansion and management transfer 
(2003 to present). 
Fortune saw an opportunity at the national level.  There was a gap in the market to 
create a modern trade discount store for home building materials.  The changing 
trend of customer’s shopping habits was evident in the grocery sector. Tanya 
believed that the construction materials retail sector would this trend follow soon 
after.  In order to lay the groundwork for the next generation, they decided to 
expand the business to other provinces in order to capture the market opportunity at 
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the national level.  In 2003, they opened a second branch with large warehouses in 
the same province.  The wholesale unit was moved to that branch.    
Alisa and Sarah graduated in 2004-5 and came back to help their parents.  Eddy 
began to plan for the construction models, IT systems, and logistics and operation 
control for future branches. Tanya assigned Alisa to help her in the marketing and 
purchasing units.  Alisa took care of non-key products whereas Tanya still runs 
purchasing for strategic products such as steel and cements.  Sarah also took 
responsibility for revamping the accounting and IT systems.  She recently finished 
implementing the enterprise resource planning system in 2009. 
In 2007, Fortune opened the third modern trade retailing branch in another big city 
in the northeastern region of Thailand.  This city is a major hub for manufacturing 
and logistics in this region.  Fortune expected to compete with local specialty stores 
in this province.  The new branch used the name “HomeCentre by Fortune” to 
focus on the modern trade retailing market.  The fourth branch of Fortune was 
scheduled to open in July 2010 in a province close to Bangkok to serve the 
Bangkok metropolitan areas. 
Competition 
The competition became more intense.  In their hometown, Fortune is still the 
market leader but the local stores have started to expand their business and adopt a 
modern trade format.  For instance, the store of Arthur, the eldest brother of the 
Koh family, copied the business model of Fortune.  He changed from selling paints 
to a full range of home building products in a huge modern store outside the city 
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centre.  Ted, the youngest brother of the Koh family expanded the business from 
being only the dealer of a cement product to a modern trade store as well.   
Regarding the competition at the national level, there is no clear market leader.  
Capital from the upcountry, such as Fortune and HouseMarket (from the 
northeastern region of Thailand) tried to build new branches in major cities around 
Thailand.  Now, the Central Group --Bangkok based renowned conglomerate who 
owns a “HomeMart” store for home decoration and DIY market-- created a new 
store with the name “Thai Watsadu” to compete for the market in the Bangkok and 
metropolitan areas too. 
Strategy 
For the strategy in the hometown, as the market leader, Fortune focused on drawing 
customers to the store and increasing revenue per customer.  The growth in sales 
volume would increase their negotiation power with the suppliers.  Also, in order to 
reduce the cost, new technologies were adopted.  For instance, Fortune demanded 
suppliers to adopt the barcode system to save handling costs and make the 
operation faster.  Fortune continued to support charities and local events but these 
activities were made public to show their corporate social responsibilities. 
Regarding the strategy for the national market, Fortune relies mainly on the retail 
customers since the contractors’ credibility is difficult to assess. Some suppliers, 
who have a good relationship with Fortune, provided information about 
competition and risks for Tanya.  Moreover, Fortune used the alliance strategy with 
local home construction businesses, contractors, and banks to create an event to 
draw customers to the new store.  
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Management and Organisation 
Fortune adopted new corporate governance.  The decision makers are the members 
of the board (Eddy, Tanya, Alisa and Sarah).  They try to reach a consensus instead 
of using a vote.  In areas of conflict, the parents still have a final decision. The 
profit sharing is in the form of salaries and dividend.  Tanya and Eddy aim to make 
the profit sharing as fair as possible.  Tanya wants to treat her daughters and sons 
equally. Thus, each child has a 15 percent share in the firm. 
The executives begin to decentralise more power to the head of the units in order to 
decrease the workload.  The expansion to other provinces requires new middle 
level management.  However, external mangers are hard to find and cannot blend 
in with the family business.  Fortune chose to send trustworthy staff to oversee the 
new stores.   
 The organisation structure has become formal.  The new software system makes 
the work flows and processes between units clearer.  The operation is based on 
rules and regulations of the company.  Some units have begun to create working 
manuals in which each job has a job description and clear expectation.  More 
employees are recruited; for instance, the purchasing staff grew from four to 16 
staff to take care of 120,000 items.  As the market leader in the province, Fortune 
now faces stricter rules and regulations about social welfare of its employees.  The 
operation since the second phase has changed to match the lifestyle of Thai 
customers and employees.  Fortune operates every day and its vacation period has 
changed from Chinese New Year to Thai New Year (in April) only. 
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The relationship with customers and suppliers has become more professional based 
upon rules. The number of credit accounts was frozen and some required the bank 
guaranteed documents and collateral.  However, some old customers and suppliers 




6. Dynamic Capabilities 
This chapter discusses and compares dynamic capabilities (sensing, seizing, and 
managing threats) and the microfoundations of Eternity and Fortune with Teece’s 
model. 
6.1 Sensing   
The sensing capability is very important for Eternity and Fortune for adapting their 
businesses with the changes in customer demand, technology and market.  In this 
section, I will discuss the microfoundation of Eternity and Fortune by comparing 
them with Teece’s sensing microfoundations to show how these companies discern 
and filter business opportunities. 
Eternity and Fortune’s sensing microfoundation is informal and embedded in its 
people; it has not yet transferred to the systems or processes as suggested by Teece.  
These two cases are family businesses in the retail industry.  From this 
organisational type and their industry, they do not aim to create formal processes to 
conduct the R&D or set up dedicated units to take care of sensing. The 
responsibility to notice the trends (see Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2) lies with the 
owners.   
1. Processes to identify target market segments, changing customer needs and 
customer innovation. 
Eternity and Fortune rely on information from external and internal sources.  The 
external source mostly comes from strong ties (such as relatives and long-time 
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business partners) to guarantee the implementability of the ideas.  For instance, the 
turning point from a small retailer to the shopping centre of Eternity in 1992 was 
due to the business knowledge of Jasmine’s sister-in-law who operated a shopping 
mall in the neighbouring province.  The experience and training from this sister-in-
law helped Eternity to set up the shopping mall without trial and error. 
My mom, she wanted to open a shopping mall because she saw my 
aunt opening a successful shopping mall in another province. The 
shopping mall business model was good because we could sell 
products with a higher margin. We could open a shopping mall very 
fast because our capital was ready.  My aunt sent some staff to train 
our employees and coached us how to run the mall. 
(Brian, Eternity) 
Apart from external ideas, some trends are perceived by the business experience 
and creative capabilities of the entrepreneurs.  Tanya made a decision to move from 
the first store in the city centre to the current area after she realised the threats from 
the old location.  The new location required her to take risks and make a bigger 
investment.  However, she had an innovative idea with the new store.  Tanya’s 
ability to sense the opportunities made Fortune the leader of retailers in her 
province. 
We grew bigger and bigger. We started to think that we outgrew the 
location.  …  At that time, the bank predicted that we would fail 
since this land was too far from the inner city and commercial 
district and [we] had to fill the land up by eight metres.  It’s only the 
land in the middle of nowhere, only the forest.  I wanted to take an 8 
million [baht] loan from the bank.  They didn’t think that the 
customers would go to buy from us.  However, we thought 
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differently, we need the parking space for a variety of products 
instead of going to buy one product at one shop.  I think that if we 
didn’t move out, our business would die within five years due to 
congestion of traffic and work.    
(Tanya, Fortune) 
2. Processes to tap external innovation26 
 Both cases sometimes tap their multinational suppliers for innovation.  For 
example, after the advent of foreign retailers in the province, Jasmine asked an 
American multinational to help her improve the efficiency of stock and purchasing 
by using the just-in-time technique. 
 Whereas the processes to search external science and technology are not a routine 
process, both companies would set a mission and then search for the technology 
from all of their contacts.  When Eternity, for example, was planning to move to 
the current site in 2002, the executives teamed up to search for the most suitable 
construction model and cooling system from various sources. 
Allan surveyed all the construction models, for air-conditioning 
systems, to build the store with the lowest cost.  Allan has a relative 
who is a civil engineer …We travelled to many provinces to look at 
construction models.  We also observed the model of foreign stores.  
The cooling system we now use was in fact used in the textile 
factory and in chicken farming.   
(Jasmine, Eternity)  
                                                 
26
 I combined two related elements of Teece’s sensing microfoudnation (tapping supplier and 




3. Processes to direct internal R&D and select new technologies 
 Both cases focus on the process improvement such as the implementation of 
enterprise resource planning systems.  Fortune, however, has a dedicated unit 
responsible for internal process improvement.  Eddy, the managing director with an 
engineering background, has taken care of operational development from the start 
of the company.  His rationale for his continuous improving of operations was not 
because of his engineering background; but it was due to his problem solving skills 
and the necessity to run the business.  
It [Eddy’s engineering background] might have some effects on my 
decision. Or, it might not relate to my decision at all.  We had to 
solve the problem.  No matter what discipline we studied, we had to 
find the solution anyway since we are problem solving people.  
(Eddy, Fortune) 
 
For Eternity, each family member takes care of their own work process 
improvement.  Brian, who controls the distribution centre, created innovative ideas 
of head shelf’s advertisement and a new products’ booth in the prime area.  These 
product booths brought in a new revenue channel for his store. 
If you [the researcher/author] look at those product islands in the 
middle of the store, that’s the idea of Mr. Brian.  He came up with 
his [pyramid-like] style of island to promote products.  This area 
was sold to us [suppliers] to use as a promotion area.  I think it is a 
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good idea to get more revenue and you will never see this kind of 
product booths in other stores.  
(A sale manager of a Japanese consumer products company) 
 
 Both companies have tried to devise their own solution by looking at how the 
foreign retailers do and then adapt the solution to match with their limited 
resources.  For example, Fortune made its own shelf from the steel sold in the store 
in order to save costs. 
This is the first generation shelf that we made for using in the 
“Super” [Fortune’s retail store]. I notice the shelf in foreign stores.  
Their steel is thick and has a nice painted finish.  This would be too 
expensive for us.  We used the thinner steel that we sell and have 




In the current competitive context, both firms recognise the need to have their 
middle managers and lower staff to help them in the sensing activities because the 
executives are tied up with the expansion plan.  Allan tried to involve the staff to 
help drive his business.  He encouraged his staff to propose ideas to the executives 
by giving incentives. 
I tried to challenge my employees to think.  We, the leaders, always 
believe that they [subordinates] do not have good ideas.  Look, we 
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don’t have time to think about everything, right?  One time, I told 
them, each unit, to think about products for customers’ redemption 
scheme.  Whichever unit has the most products redeemed by 
customers, will be rewarded.  This is an example of the things that 
I’ve tried to do, to change from us [leaders] and customers to us 
[leaders], staff, and customers.  
(Allan, Eternity) 
 
In summary, the sensing microfoundation of Eternity and Fortune is informal 
compared with Teece’s model. The executives are still the main group who search 
and monitor the trends of the businesses. There is an attempt to include employees 
in the sensing activities. 
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6.2 Seizing   
Seizing capability is crucial for capturing opportunities and making good 
investments to create profits for the firms.   In this section, I discuss how the 
seizing microfoundation of Eternity and Fortune is similar to and different from 
Teece’s model. 
Teece suggests four selected elements are necessary for seizing opportunities (see 
Figure 2-4 in Chapter 2). These elements aim to explain the seizing 
microfoundation (structure, procedures and incentives) of firms in the high-tech 
industries.  Thus, when applied to Eternity and Fortune’s retail businesses, 
“managing complements and control platforms”27 becomes irrelevant. 
1. Delineating the customer solution and the business model 
Nowadays both firms develop a more thorough and formal business plan.  In the 
past, for instance, Jasmine had a rough model of a shopping mall in her mind and 
discussed her plan with her mother in law, Norah, who was the leader of the first 
generation.  Tanya only discussed the idea with her husband, Eddy, before they 
moved out from the city centre.  However, at present, given the stronger 
competition and limited resources, both firms have a smaller room for error and 
hence require a comprehensive and solid business plan.  The business model of 
Eternity in the third generation is to turn around the ailing shopping mall business 
and compete with both foreign and local retailers in the province.  Fortune aspires 
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to maintain growth in the province and capture the market opportunity at the 
national level.  Business models of the two cases were brainstormed by all family 
members. The staff did not participate in the process since it was regarded as a 
family matter; they would only participate in non-strategic issues such as functional 
operations.   
2. Selecting decision making protocols 
Like other family businesses, the decision making of both firms is centralised at the 
executive level. The benefit of centralisation of the decision making is that both 
firms can take action very fast.  However, the staff tend to wait for their orders 
from the top.  Eternity uses the voting system among family members whereas 
Fortune tries to get the consensus among executives.  Allan admitted that the 
voting system was a fair mechanism for making a decision. Nevertheless, at times, 
he was frustrated when other executives voted against his plan because it tried to 
“drive the organisation too fast.”  Fortune’s consensus approach might cause less 
friction between executives, but it occasionally takes a longer time to reach a 
compromised solution.  Sometimes the solution of the contentious issue is a 
combination of everyone’s idea. 
We [our family members] talk and talk until everyone agrees.  Yes, 
there are some issues that we do not agree on. The solution 
sometimes is to pick this point of Dad’s idea and that point of 
mom’s idea and add them together.  Anyway, as a daughter with 
limited experience, we normally give in. 
(Alisa, Fortune) 
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Given that employees know that the executives have the final say, the official line 
of command and organisational units may be bypassed.  This undermines the 
decentralisation attempt to reduce the work load of the executives.   Jasmine gave 
an example where the employees did not follow the decision making process.  The 
staff had an issue with her subordinate.  She chose to direct the conflict to Brian 
instead of the HR department and in the end this issue caused Brian considerable 
trouble. 
The head of cashier staff reported to Brian that her subordinate did 
not follow her orders.  Brian believed her and gave the order to 
dismiss that person.  That person filed a petition to the labour and 
social welfare office.  Brian was fined for unfair treatment and not 
following the HR process.  In fact, this matter should not have been 
an issue at all if the head cashier had followed the HR procedure.  
She must discuss this matter with HR department, not with Brian, 
and try to solve her problem there. 
(Jasmine, Eternity) 
3. Selecting enterprise boundaries to manage complements and the control 
platform 
In Teece’s model, firms must try to control their intellectual property, find 
complementary products, and consider how to collaborate with suppliers and 
customers.  The partnership with suppliers and other firms makes the boundaries of 
firms porous and flexible.    
Given the nature of retail businesses, Eternity and Fortune do not need to be overly 
concerned about their intellectual assets.  However, both firms, currently, focus 
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more on the issue of the collaboration with their business partners in order to 
increase their competitiveness.  Eternity and Fortune organise many sale and 
marketing events (e.g. the Mid-Year sale) by asking their key suppliers to 
contribute to the expense of the events.  These special sale events are very 
successful and generate revenue for the stores and the participating suppliers.  The 
manager of a foreign competitor had to visit the Eternity store and observed the 
event (because that store does not have policy to set up sale events).  Brian pointed 
out that Eternity’s relationship with suppliers become a partnership.  Suppliers 
have to help local stores more to reduce the dependence on the foreign modern 
trade channels.  Brian would create a special campaign with the companies who 
collaborated with him. 
The foreign stores have at least one advantage.  In the past, we never 
knew that we could get some support from the suppliers.  When the 
foreign modern trade came in, they requested special treatment, 
discounted prices, and demanded many handling fees from 
suppliers.  Now, the suppliers know that if they still support only the 
modern trade [foreign] stores and leave us to die, they will be in 
dead trouble one day.  So, they begin to support and help us more.  
In fact, it’s a win-win situation, we could sell more, [and] their sales 
target will be achieved.  Now, the relationship is like a business 
partner …They want the number [the sale target], right?  I would 
ask the sale managers of each supplier “how much can you support 
us?”   I will create a marketing campaign with those who agree to 
participate. They have to go back to their company and get the 
marketing budget, goodies, giveaways, and purchasing consultant 
staff to work at our store.  I mean anything that can support and 
increase the sales. 
 (Brian, Eternity) 
  94
Fortune used the same strategy to develop collaboration projects with suppliers to 
draw customers to the store. A sale manager noted: 
We have a very close relationship with Fortune.  Ar Sor, [Tanya] 
would call me and say like “Hey, brother Somchai, next month we 
gonna have an [sale] event. Can you give me 1,000 bags of cement 
with a special price?”  I then would discuss with my boss and give 
her what she wants.   
(A sale manager of a local construction materials manufacturer) 
Another change in the boundary of Eternity in this era comes from the strategy to 
expand its convenience stores, “GreatPrice”.  The objective is to make a network of 
discount convenience stores in major communities around the province to increase 
the sales volume of Eternity.  Also, this strategy is to capture markets before the 
foreign companies invest in this province.  The presence of GreatPrice convenience 
stores might affect some small retailers who are Eternity’s customers.  
Nevertheless, this is a crucial strategy to control the sales volume for Eternity.  
We need a stable sales volume and thus we decided to open our own 
convenience stores. Now we have about 15 stores and next week 
we’re going to open a new branch next to Penta High School.  
(Allan, Eternity) 
 
4. Building loyalty and commitment 
 The commitment of family members and staff is vital for seizing the opportunities. 
A challenge in this new era is to maintain good and loyal staff while attracting new 
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capable employees.  Leaders have an important role to increase morale and loyalty 
of the staff.  In 1996, Fortune faced a strike by old employees when new employees 
were given higher salaries.  Tanya solved this problem by explaining the rationale 
to the strike’s leader and reminding him of the importance of new employees to the 
company. 
Uncle, you worked with me since my mom’s era, right?  You know 
me well, right?  Our company now is growing.  We want good 
people so that we can work less.  Don’t be disheartened by the lower 
pay.  We have to pay for their knowledge and expertise.  If we don’t 
get good people, our company, both you and I can’t survive.  Uncle, 
just help me; focus on your work.  Monitor and train the new 
employees so that our business can go on. 
(Tanya, Fortune) 
For Eternity, the executives have some schemes to modernise the organisation and 
make the employees proud to work with the company such as designing a new 
modern uniform for the staff and having a bonus. 
As for the leadership, Eternity’s executives used different approaches to lead their 
staff.  Allan, the CEO, preferred to remain distant from his staff and have a formal 
relationship.  His staff will call him “Mr. Allan” to show their respect.  Brian 
prefers to have close relationship with his subordinates.  He works near the 
receptionist area in front of the distribution centre instead of his office. His reason 
is to be “close to the staff and clients” and to know what is going on in the store.   
The leadership style of Fortune is paternalistic (authoritarianism, benevolent 
leadership, and leader morality and integrity) (Farh and Cheng 2000).  All 
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employees and suppliers are in awe of Tanya.  While working, Tanya is determined 
and takes quick action.  Staff may be scolded if they make serious mistakes.  
However, Tanya is very caring and treats her staff as a family member.  She 
teaches her children to care for the well-being of staff and their family.  Tanya set a 
policy that her children should not fire old loyal staff (unless for very serious 
matters) because “a new employee’s gonna think that, hey, this firm has no old 
staff.  I will have no chance to grow with the firm.” 
One of her loyal staff who was a branch manager at another province fell ill due to 
hard working.  The following quote shows Tanya’s authoritarian and caring traits: 
Do you wanna die?  Pack your stuff and come back here now!  If 
you don’t eat and don’t take care of yourself, stop working and 
come back here.  If you died, what would happen with your family? 
Don’t you love your family and children?  Do you want your 
husband to have a new wife?  How would your children live with a 
new mother?  If anything happened to you, my business will suffer 
too.  I send you to work.  Your family must be well off too.  Promise 
me now that you will eat on time…Say it!  
(Tanya, Fortune) 
6.3 Managing threats and Reconfiguration  
Firms will grow and make profits if they can identify market opportunities and 
make a smart investment.  To maintain profitable growth, firms need to be able to 
recombine their assets to address the changing environments (Teece 2007:1337).  
The following section describes how Eternity and Fortune realign their assets when 




In order to facilitate the realignment of assets, firms must create a decentralised 
organisation; develop cospecialised assets; improve governance and incentive 
systems; and set up knowledge management systems (see Figure 2-5 in Chapter 2).  
Among the four elements, cospecialisation28 does not directly relate to the retailing 
business of Eternity and Fortune and thus, will not be discussed in this section. 
 
1. Decentralisation 
During the past five years, Eternity and Fortune have tried to decentralise the 
decision power to middle and lower managers.  Both firms set up an organisation 
structure with a clear line of command.  Operation improvement, such as the 
implementation of enterprise resource planning systems, also helped formalise the 
organisational structure and work processes.   
Now our organisational structure becomes clearer because the ERP 
software requires us to map our work processes with the software. 
We have to look into detail of each unit and how it functions and 
works with other units. 
(Sarah, Fortune) 
To integrate data and knowledge from lower managers after decentralisation, 
Eternity set formal meetings with managers every week whereas Fortune uses 
                                                 
28
 Cospecialised assets means “a particular class of complementary assets where the value of an 
asset is a function of its use in conjunction with other particular assets”. An example is light bulbs 
and the electric power system of Thomas Edison. (Teece 2007:1338) 
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informal meetings.  The Eternity meetings serve as the channel to integrate the 
information from every unit for the CEO. 
I call a meeting every week, Monday for the DC [distribution/ 
wholesale store] sales team, Tuesday with executives, Wednesday 
with convenience stores and marketing teams, and Thursday I will 
visit and monitor the convenience stores and discuss the issues with 
them [store managers]. 
(Allan, Eternity) 
The executives of both firms admitted that they need capable middle management 
to help run the business.  The executives brought in external managers who had 
worked with professional firms but they could not cope with the idiosyncrasy of 
family businesses.  To solve the lack of a middle management level, executives 
promoted the trustworthy loyal low-education staff to be middle managers and tried 
to train them.   
I have a problem of low-educated staff.  They are good at selling but 
they don’t have charm.  They do not like to learn … I have to retrain 
them.  I lecture and give new management ideas during the 
meetings.  Sometimes I invited local professors to conduct training 
and set the exam to measure what they learn from the training.   
(Allan, Eternity) 
Even decision power have been delegated to middle managers, in practice, the 
executives may intervene and overrule the decision when the executives know that 
the managers have made mistakes. This reflects the challenge between 
decentralisation and centralisation in Chinese businesses. 
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Our warehouse manager rejected the returned goods of a long-time 
customer because the goods were returned some time later than 
specified in the return policy of the firm.  The customer was so 
upset and stopped buying from us.  I had to call the warehouse 
manager to send the truck out now to collect the returned goods of 




Good governance and incentive systems could enhance the reconfiguration 
capability.  Eternity and Fortune adopted a corporate governance system several 
years ago to prevent conflicts among family members.  Earlier, both firms used the 
traditional gongsi system in which the parents manage the family’s money.  Parents 
have unrestricted power to use and give differential amounts of money to children.  
There is no formal proportion specifying how much each person has in gongsi 
money.  The corporate governance initiative came from Fortune.  Tanya asked for 
advice from her towkays29 how well-established Chinese family businesses 
manage the family money and guard against conflicts between siblings.  Then, 
Fortune introduced this idea to Eternity where the siblings in the third generation 
are running the business and increasingly doubt the fairness of the gongsi system.  
Brian pointed out the lack of personal independence in the gongsi system. 
                                                 
29
 Towkay is the Chinese (Teochew) word for business owners who started up and run a successful 
business.  
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I’ve grown up! I have my own family [1 wife and 3 kids] I want to 
be free to use my money.  In the gongsi system, I had to ask for 
money from my parents in every matter.  
(Brian, Eternity) 
The corporate governance changes the incentive structure of Eternity and Fortune.  
Each family member is given a concrete amount of shares in the family business 
and is entitled to receive dividends and bonuses each year.   
As for the incentive to staff, both firms give out bonuses to employees when their 
sale revenue reaches the target.  Allan gave a bonus last year to boost morale of 
employees, even though the company failed to reach the revenue target. 
In fact, last year we did not achieve our target.  But it was not the 
employees’ fault.  They worked really hard to meet my goal.  It’s 
the bad economic situation that caused the lower performance.  
Anyway, I decided to give them bonus to lift their spirits.  But I 
said, this year they had to work even harder.   
(Allan, Eternity) 
 
3 Knowledge management 
The ability to combine knowledge from internal sources and external sources is 
crucial for the asset recombination.  Eternity and Fortune’s knowledge is mostly 
tacit and embedded in individuals.  Solutions and policies from meetings are not 
well documented.  For instance, when the audit committee from the local 
government agency asked for past minutes of Eternity’s meetings, staff could not 
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provide them.  Some old staff are afraid to share and train new staff.  The 
executives urge staff to codify knowledge and create manuals for operation.   
When I oversee the purchasing unit, I think they [the staff] lack the 
work manuals of how to purchase each product.  I order them to 
create the files and manuals so that everyone can replace the one 
who is absent.   
(Alisa, Fortune) 
Fortune also displays a guideline on how to work with the company and the contact 
number of the owners in order to increase the efficiency. Figure 6.1 shows the 
notice, printed on a white A-4 sticker placed at each pillar at the purchasing office 
to facilitate the operation between suppliers and the purchasing staff: 
Guideline for working with the purchasing unit
1. Please make appointment in advance.
2. Please confirm your appointment.
3. Please … .
4. If supplier’s agents do not receive good service from    
purchasing staffs, 
please contact Ms. Alisa at  [mobile phone number]
Or  Ms. Tanya at [mobile phone number].
 
Figure 6-1: The notice notifying how to work with the purchasing unit of Fortune. 
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7. The Evolution of Chinese Businesses   
According to the literature, there are four distinct features of Chinese businesses.  
This chapter describes the characteristics and how these features in Eternity and 
Fortune evolved.  
7.1 Paternalistic and centripetal control  
Chinese businesses tend to centralise the control at the head of family. At present, 
Eternity and Fortune are still centralised organisations.  However, the control is not 
solely at the patriarch level.  The system of corporate governance was introduced.  
For Eternity, Jasmine, the head of Eternity’s second generation, gave up her 
managing director position in 2006.  Eternity introduced the board of directors, and 
CEO system.  Allan, Brian and Brian’s wife,30 Cecilia, and Jasmine sit on the 
board of directors.  Allan is the CEO who has the power to sign contracts and 
represent the company.  Fortune also has the board of directors where four family 
members are directors.  The head of executive of Fortune is Eddy, managing 
director and Tanya is vice managing director.  Alisa and Sarah have no official 
executive positions within the firm.  
These two family businesses changed to the corporate governance system because 
their children are grown up and came back to run the firms after college. The 
parents want to make them collaborate efficiently and harmoniously.  Both families 
acknowledged the limitations of the gongsi system.  This traditional system 
centralises the decision power and profits at the parental level. Profits may not be 
                                                 
30
 Brian’s wife --Lyn-- moved into Eternity’s family after their marriage in 2003.  She withdrew 
from the board of directors in 2008. 
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distributed based on performance.  The new corporate system allows dividends and 
bonuses to be paid based on a clear shareholding structure.  This is aimed to give 
incentive and reduce potential for conflicts from unfair profit sharing.  Tanya 
realised the conflicts caused by the traditional gongsi system from her parents’ 
generation.  To prevent the future conflicts, she introduced the idea of corporate 
governance to Eternity. 
This is what I always warned Paul and Jasmine to make clear about 
percentage of shares for each member [of their family] and from 
what amount [of total gongsi money]?  If not it would raise conflicts 
[between siblings].  Look at my [Tanya’s] brothers, they rarely 
visited my mom because they believed that they were treated 
unfairly.  When they came, they often cut short the conversation of 
my mom.                                
(Tanya, Fortune) 
In practice, the new corporate governance system of both cases is not fully 
functional because of the role conflicts.  When one person takes the role of a board 
member, a manager of the firm as well as a family member, it is difficult to 
perform each expected role effectively. 
For instance, the directors on the board cannot independently control, monitor, and 
voice concerns on the management of another family member because this could 
lead to personal conflicts in family.  Thus, some family members may choose to 
avoid the confrontation with other family members in order to protect the harmony 
of the family. 
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Cecilia and I sometimes have to waive our rights to vote [in the 
board of directors and executive meetings] in some issues because 
we do not want to make the relationship [in our family] turn sour.  
(Lyn, Brian’s wife, Eternity) 
Eternity has a leadership challenge because Jasmine gave up the management 
power to her three children in 2006.  Although Allan, the eldest son, is officially 
appointed CEO and should be the leader of the family for the third generation 
according to the Chinese culture, the leadership was far from being patriarchal and 
sometimes he was challenged by his brother, Brian.  As both of them grew up 
together as friends, and Brian seems to need equal and fair treatment from the 
parents. They had quarrels on both personal and business’ issues. Currently, the 
line of command and decision making process of Eternity are not clear.  Allan and 
Brian separated the responsibility in the firm.  Brian has not joined any meeting.  In 
case of decision making in the meeting, each executive seems to have a solution in 
mind but uses the meeting to notify others.  Allan believed that the inability to 
separate the role of owners and the role of management in the new corporate 
governance which leads to the leadership problems. 
Brian has full authority over purchasing [for the company] and I do 
not intervene.  However, I had the authority to sign the company’s 
cheques.  …  Now, he wants to sign them too.  This would slow the 
work process and it means that he could not separate the ownership 
role and employment role.   Normally, the final decision maker 
should be me, the CEO, right? 
(Allan, Eternity) 
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Unlike Eternity, Fortune currently does not have leadership issues because the 
parents still hold the executive power.  They tried to use consensus instead of 
voting.  Eddy represented the company in public events.  For suppliers and 
customers when they think of Fortune, the image of Tanya would arise due to her 
distinct characteristics: “outspoken, sincere, no-nonsense and big-hearted”.   
Realising the potential threats of having siblings working together in the family, 
Tanya was preparing the governance model by asking for advice from close ties.  
She hoped to create a fair and effective system that all her three children can 
continue the family business.  However, Eddy and Tanya did not plan to give up 
their control until they were sure about the children’s performance.  Thus, during 
this transition period, the governance and shareholding structure were designed to 
keep power in the couple’s hands. 
Eddy has 30% of Fortune’s shares, I have 25%. The three of them 
[Alisa, Sarah, and Henry] has 15% each.  In the case where they 
cooperate to fight us, we have 55% to fight them back. [Tanya 
laughed out loud].  I told them everything and the rationale too 
[Tanya laughed again].   
(Tanya, Fortune) 
Given the need for decentralisation in order to better manage the growing 
businesses, external managers were hired to professionalise working processes in 
some areas such as finance, IT, and marketing.  However, these managers could not 
stay for a long time because they sometimes had work conflicts with family 
members.   Some could not drive the promised initiatives and could not adapt 
themselves to the culture of family businesses.  The distrust in non-family members 
is very strong among Chinese businesses (Tong 2008).  When recruiting an 
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external manager, the owners sometimes face a challenge whether they should trust 
this person.  Managers who pose a threat to the family business would be 
eliminated. 
A professional manager whom I hired could not stay with us 
because he thought that he was smart.  He tried to abuse the power 
to take control over us; he liked to approach our staff.  He tried to 
get as many people to work with him and ally with him.  But since 
we [our family] have a fighting spirit, I did not give in or was afraid 
of our staff being taken over. So I invited him to leave after being 
with us 3-4 years.   
(Jasmine, Eternity)      
        
7.2 Informality  
This feature of Chinese business is the area in which Eternity and Fortune have 
undergone many changes.  Currently, both cases create and implement more rules 
and regulations to systematise their work processes to increase efficiency.  A good 
operation system is expected to support Eternity and Fortune’s ability to capture 
business opportunity and reconfigure their businesses. Both firms examined the 
model of foreign retailers and acknowledged the need to have regulations to grow 
and expand their businesses. Organisation structure was elaborated and staff were 
expected to perform tasks specified in their position. 
The organisation chart now represents our real firm. Every 
employee must know their role and expectation. I gave my staff 
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homework.  I told them to write their job description because I want 
to know what they are doing.     
(Allan, Eternity) 
Moreover, Eternity and Fortune are implementing new rules and regulations in this 
period to comply with the government requirement such as safety laws, drugs 
control and social welfare of employees.  Larger companies are normally in the 
monitor of the government agency because the government hopes to make them 
good examples for small firms.  An officer commented about Eternity and Fortune 
on the implementation of government regulation. 
I remembered when I first examined Eternity and Fortune’s social 
welfare of their employees; they did not follow every regulation 
specified by our office.  We gave the HR manager a list of 
improvement areas.  Now, both of them have done quite well.   
 (A local government officer) 
Being a family firm, the overlapping of business norms (being professional, formal 
and accountable) and family norms (having unconditional loyalty to family, sincere 
understanding of other members, and informality) occurs (Chiu 1998). Family 
members may not know which norm should apply when they work with another 
family member.  This could cause uneasiness and confusion.  For instance, during 
the first few months, when Alisa and Sarah started to work with Tanya, Tanya was 
so worried about how to tell them when they made mistakes.  According to the 
business norm, she should warn them and let them know.  However, from the 
family norm, she did not want to do that because she “didn’t want to discourage my 
[her] children.” 
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Even the attempt to have rule of laws and set the clear role in family business, in 
reality, family members still hold discretionary power to overrule the regulations or 
policy. Some family members might change the rules that are considered 
impractical and could cause troubles in the work process. The members might 
devise a temporary solution that is not in line with the initial objectives.  Normally, 
staff and other family members do not want to intervene and challenge this 
overrule.  Here is an example where Brian overruled the voucher policy: 
 I told my customers not to care for the policy of the marketing unit 
that limited the amount of voucher usage per month.  Look, I am the 
one who deals with the customers all the time.  I told them that if 
they cannot use the voucher [to buy products in Eternity’s store], 
just give it to me and I would give them my money.  I had to make 
my customers happy.   
(Brian, Eternity) 
Both firms strive to balance the business and family goals. The increase in 
efficiency and business performance is less important than the healthy family 
relationship.  This is because unity in family business is a crucial factor for survival 
and competitiveness in the long run.  In the case of Fortune, when someone in the 
family makes mistakes, the family members avoid finding the culprit; this is their 
strategy to generate good family relationship. 
I always teach my children that when we have problems [in our 
firm], we should not find fault with other family members.  In our 
family, nobody is wrong.  We must try to understand that person 
and the mistake. There is no point for blame games. 
 (Tanya, Fortune) 
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7.3 Reliance on interpersonal relationships  
Using interpersonal relationships in business is a distinct feature of Chinese 
enterpreneurs.  Eternity and Fortune still utilise interpersonal relationships, guanxi, 
in business transactions because having a good relationship with business partners 
allows them access to richer and more valuable information and special treatment.  
This, in turn, strengthens the dynamic capability to sense, to seize and to 
reconfigure their businesses.  Fortune could weather the financial problems during 
the crisis in 1997 because of the helpful advice from long-time suppliers.       
During the 1997 crisis, we had a serious cash flow and foreign debt 
problem.  My towkays gave me advice on how to negotiate with the 
bank.  They told me when I should stock the products and when to 
sell … at what currency rate I should settle the foreign debt. 
(Tanya, Eternity) 
Another example shows how Tanya used guanxi relationships with suppliers to 
obtain richer information about risks from the new customer group. 
When Ar Sor [Older sister; Tanya] opened a new branch in another 
province, she called me to check the credit of some of her new 
customers.  I phoned my contacts and told her which one was good 
and which one was bad. 
(A sales manager of a local home building materials company) 
However, the characteristics of interpersonal relationship nowadays have witnessed 
some changes as follows: 
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The type of organisation and the policy of counterparts affect the efficacy of the 
interpersonal relationship strategy.  In the past, Eternity and Fortune mostly dealt 
with suppliers and customers who are Chinese family businesses.  Both parties 
preferred to establish personal relationship and exchange favours. 
Nowadays, some major suppliers of Eternity and Fortune are multinationals who 
have policies that promote equal treatment based on rules and regulations. Hence, 
both cases cannot use guanxi with these type of firms.  Tanya pointed out that “it is 
difficult to deal with farang [foreign firms]; they are picky and inflexible.”  They 
have no policy to negotiate with us.”  If the owners of both cases, however, could 
choose the business partners, they would prefer local firms who accept the concept 
of personal relationship and could equally answer their need.   Somchai, a sale 
manager, explained why Tanya’s switch to work with his company: 
Ar Sor [older sister; Tanya] used to be a dealer for Cement X for 
many years.  But when that company was taken over by foreigners, 
she complained about the poorer treatment she got.  Finally she 
changed to sell our cement.  Our company is also a [local Thai-
Chinese] family business.  When Ar Sor is not happy with anything, 
she can ring up and talk with Mr. Pad, the owner right away.   
However, it seems difficult to avoid dealing with professional and foreign firms in 
the globalised economic situation.  Eternity and Fortune would, then, aim to create 
a good personal relationship with sales representatives of major suppliers.  This is a 
win-win situation.  The sales managers could ask for help to advance their personal 
career while Eternity and Fortune would get special treatment and inside 
information.  For instance, Brian negotiated with the director of a multinational to 
rotate the former sales manager back to the province because the old manager got 
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along well with him and offered more help than the current one.         
In fact, I was rotated to [be a sales manager in] other province.  
Brian was not satisfied with the help [discount and marketing 
budget to support Eternity store] of the new sales manager.  Brian 
told my boss that if he still wanted to do business with Eternity, then 
send me back here.  So, I came to work in this province again.   
(A sales manager from a leading multinational consumer product 
company). 
 The following example shows how Brian gave special favours to a sales manager 
who had a good relationship with him. 
I had one of the best spaces in the store and some of them I do not 
have to pay [the promotion fee].  I asked Mr. Brian for permission to 
use some small space at the cashier counter to show my latest 
products.  He told me ‘Go ahead.’  My rival product companies 
envied me a lot. 
(A sales manager from a Japanese consumer product firm) 
To maintain interpersonal relationships, both parties need to follow the norm of 
reciprocity (Tong and Yong 1998).  The new generation of Thai-Chinese appears to 
be concerned more about tangible benefits from interpersonal relationships.  The 
cost of relationship maintenance and the potential benefits of future relationships are 
sometimes carefully evaluated.  Brian told one of his mother’s long-time suppliers 
that “if towkay want to sell products to us, please use the barcode too.”  This is 
because the handling for products without barcode cost Eternity much time and 
resources.  He believed the suppliers must develop their business process to match 
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with Eternity so that both parties could carry on a good business relationship.  The 
end of relationship with long-time business partners is not easy.  However, if the 
partners failed to reciprocate and the maintenance of relationship costs too much, 
the Chinese businesses would choose to end the relationship. 
We have to end a relationship with one of our long-time suppliers, 
though he had a very, very good relationship with my mom [Tanya]. 
I tried to tell him that his price was not competitive [compared with 
his competitors].  I had tried every possible way to help him and tell 
him to change the price but he did not try to understand and help us 
out.  So, I had to let him sell to other stores.  
(Alisa, Fortune) 
Given the limited resources to invest in relationships, most of the new business 
partners of Eternity and Fortune have weak ties.  In the past, Chinese businesses 
relied on guanxi to manage risks, but it required incessant and, at times, 
disproportionate returns of favour (Tong and Yong 1998).  Currently, institutions 
(e.g. legal and banking systems) can be relied on to control risks.  The number of 
strong ties of Eternity and Fortune nowadays covers only a few long-time major 
suppliers and loyal customers who have high value business transactions.  Cecilia, 
the Chief Financial Officer of Eternity, pointed out: 
Now, we [Eternity] rarely open a credit account for our new 
customers because we want to get cash for our business’ expansion.  
But if we do, we would ask them to give us collateral such as 
ownership documents for a piece of land or car registration.  The era 
of using just promises and personal credit has long gone.  
(Cecilia, Eternity) 
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7.4 Diversification   
Unlike other Chinese businesses, Eternity and Fortune do not, however, attempt to 
establish a conglomerate firm because each family is a small family with only three 
children.  There is no need to create a firm for each child.  Furthermore, the parents 
of both families hope to unite all family members to focus on one stable and 
prosperous business in which they are specialised.  Before committing to a new 
investment project, parents in both cases discussed with their children about each 
person’s career and personal plan to check if the children want to continue the 
family business.  If the children did not want to run the business, the parents would 
abort the investment project and “run on my [their] own with my [their] group of 
staff.”  The following quote of Tanya explained her future business plan. 
Eddy and I asked if they [their children] still wanted to open new 
branches in other provinces because even with only two branches in 
our province, we were so busy already.  For the two of us, this [the 
business and profits] is more than enough and we can stop now.  But 
for our children, we wanted to know that our children intended to 
carry on in this business.  We do not want to waste their personal 
life’s chances.  But they told us that they wanted to grab this 
opportunity because business has a potential.  Then, all of us dived 





To conclude, Eternity and Fortune have grown very fast from shophouse stores into 
modern trade retailers in the past 20 years.  Both cases show the ability to grasp the 
business opportunities, create solid business models and remobilise limited 
resources to suit the investments.  However, these capabilities are still embedded in 
the executives, rather than in the organisation processes.  Some Chinese features, 
such as informality, that are not appropriate with the growing organisations are 
replaced to enhance their competitiveness.  Centripetal control is being challenged 
whilst the interpersonal relationship could be either weak or strong ties based on 
the counterparts’ status and reciprocal actions. 
  115
8. DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I summarise the key findings about Eternity and Fortune and 
discuss the implications about dynamic capabilities and Chinese business evolution 
and the potential avenues for future research.   
8.1 Dynamic Capabilities  
Key findings  
Eternity and Fortune have managed to survive in the changing context of the Thai 
retail sector because both firms have dynamic capabilities that allow them to 
discern trends, capture opportunities by making the right investment and 
reconfigure their assets when the situation changed during the past decades. 
As Winter (2003) suggested, not all organisational changes are regarded as 
possessing dynamic capabilities; the changes from dynamic capability must be 
purposeful and require specialised resources.  Both cases are a good example of 
firms with dynamic capabilities.  In 1992, Eternity grabbed the opportunity and 
pioneered the shopping mall business in their province.  Later on, in 2002, the 
owners remobilised their assets to build modern distribution centres and chains of 
convenience stores when facing foreign competitors.  Despite the lower 
competition levels in the home building materials sector, Fortune managed threats 
by moving out of the city centre in 1994.  In 1997, it overcame massive financial 
burdens from the economic crisis and shifted their resources to focus on retail 
customers and modern trade models.  
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Compared with Teece’s microfoundation model, the microfoundations of Eternity 
and Fortune are relatively informal.  Processes and procedures that undergird the 
dynamic capability are not fully rationalised and still remain embedded in the 
owners.  Recognising the need to increase their competitiveness, both firms are 
continuously professionalising their business operations. 
Implications:  
From the case studies, some implications about dynamic capabilities can be drawn.  
Agency in dynamic capabilities 
The role of entrepreneurs is important for developing the capabilities (Teece 2007; 
Narayanan et al. 2009). This argument is supported by the findings of this thesis.  
The business owners of Eternity and Fortune took initiatives to improve and 
professionalise their organisations.  To sense and capture business opportunities 
nowadays is more difficult due to the changing context of ecosystems. Chinese 
business owners face tougher economic competition and thus require a more 
flexible outlook and efficiency (Chan 2000).  Conforming only to the trader and 
middle man model will barely be adequate.  They must create value for customers 
in order to gain competitiveness.   
Dynamic capabilities and survival. 
Teece suggested that the dynamic capabilities framework is most suitable for 
multinationals operating in the fast-paced industries.  Based on the influence of 
economic rationality on dynamic capabilities, the model seems to assume that the 
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firms in this framework are professional firm. The main concern of these 
professional firms, hence, is to develop efficient microfoundations of dynamic 
capabilities in order to increase their chances of survival in the long run.  
However, for family businesses, only the ability to sense, seize and reconfigure 
their assets and improve microfoundations could not guarantee their survival.  One 
of the main issues of family firms is to settle and compromise the difference of 
values and institutions.  From the lessons of Eternity and Fortune, if they rush to 
improve various operations without addressing the conflicts of values (e.g. 
leadership, equality) that underlie the new and old practices, it might lead to 
conflicts and the demise of the firms instead (Tong 2008).   This point is not 
highlighted in Teece’s model.   
Another factor that may affect the dynamic capability and survival in the long term 
is the external factor.  This may include the level of competition, population of 
organisation (Hannan and Freeman 1977) and the economic situation.  For 
instance, during the economic boom period in the early 1990s, Eternity and Fortune 
grew rapidly due to the rising demand and limited competition in their province.  
When the external factors changed abruptly, due to the economic crisis in 1997 and 
the devaluation of the baht, Fortune’s competitiveness level plunged.  Moreover, 
the external factors such as the organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) 
and institutional context could impact the survival of firms.  The dynamic of 
organisational field in Thailand is not only affected by the expansion of foreign 
retailers.  The action of other actors in the organisational field, such as the 
association of Thai local retailers and the Ministry of Commerce, the media and the 
government, also impact the survival of local retailers (c.f. Kanchoochat 2006). For 
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example, the association of local retailers tried to appeal to economic nationalism 
and voiced concern to the government about unfair competitive techniques of 
foreign retailers. The case of Phrae province illustrated how the collaboration 
between local administrative offices, local retailers and politicians that promoted 
shopping at local stores could result in the survival of local retailers.  Although 
Eternity and Fortune did not directly participate in the economic nationalism 
movement in their province, their store’s motto – “local stores for local people”-- 
also aligned with the ideas to promote localism among their customers. 
Dynamic capabilities: strengths and weaknesses of the framework 
After using this framework, the benefit is a more comprehensive framework for 
analysing the dynamic capabilities of firms.  Even though the dynamic capabilities 
framework is aimed at high-tech and fast changing industries (Teece 2007), the 
framework can be applied to shed light on the retail sector.  Following Eisenhardt 
and Martin (2000), the framework could be applied to “moderately dynamic” 
industries because in today’s context, many industries face dynamic changes 
internally and get influence from others.  Nowadays, retailing has become a global 
industry and the ecosystem is quite dynamic (Petrovic 2011). However, some 
microfoundations (e.g. cospecialisation of assets) suggested by Teece might not be 
particularly applicable to the retail industry. 
 As for the weaknesses, these seem to focus upon the inability to measure and 
compare the level of dynamic capabilities.  The findings suggest both Eternity and 
Fortune do possess the dynamic capabilities.  However, the framework does not 
provide concrete guidelines to specify which firm has more capability and in what 
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way.  Even without the comparison between firms, it is difficult to state in which 
area of capabilities (sensing, seizing, reconfigurating) Eternity performs best.  
Hence, the addition of measurement to the model would provide useful information 
for practitioners. 
Dynamic capabilities and market making 
Dynamic capabilities and other competence approaches to the firm (Nelson and 
Winter 1982) seldom regard the role of market making as one of the strategic 
competences, even though market making activities are crucial areas for firms’ 
evolution (Hamilton and Petrovic 2011).  It is argued that “[t]he evolution of firms 
is to a great degree shaped by their participation in markets and their ability to act 
as market-makers (ibid:73).”  Following this line of argument, Eternity and Fortune 
evolved into leading retailers because they changed from “market taking” to 
“market making” roles31 by emulating large foreign retailers.  Both firms carefully 
and actively engaged in customer and supplier markets.  For instance, Fortune 
could settle their substantial debts and transform into a modern trade store after 
1997 by making a new market for their retail customers whilst rearranging their 
supplier markets by issuing new rules of collaboration (e.g. collateral requirement 
for credit accounts; barcode system for all supplied products; partnership with 
suppliers in sale events).  This could serve as an example of how market making 
perspectives complements the dynamic capabilities approach. 
 
                                                 
31
 Market-makers are “those firms that assume the primary responsibility for making one or more 
of the markets [and institutions] in which they trade whereas market takers are “those that mostly 
accept exchange institutions created by someone else” (Hamilton and Petrovic 2011:41). 
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8.2 Chinese Businesses and Changes  
Key findings 
Eternity and Fortune have evolved from small traditional Chinese family 
businesses to professional firms over the past decades. The changes were an 
attempt to improve the competitiveness of the firms.  The business owners still 
focus on only one business in which  they have specialisation instead of branching 
out to other businesses as a Chinese conglomerate firm.  While the control is still in 
the hands of owners, the practices such as the paternalistic and centripetal control 
are not practical with the growing size of their companies. Corporate governance 
was used in place of the traditional gongsi system to prevent family conflicts.  The 
attempt to decentralise and bring in professional managers and lower staff is 
apparent.  Both cases move towards increasing formality in the business operations.  
They implemented a rule of laws and introduced clearer rules and regulations in 
order to improve the efficiency and business performance.  The interpersonal 
relationship is still practised but it progressively changes into professional 
relationships and weak ties.  The strong ties from the old age can be seen but both 
parties need reciprocity to strengthen the ties. 
Scholars noted that Overseas Chinese businesses in Asia have increasingly 
transformed into professional firms (c.f. Tan and Fock 2001; Menkhoff and Gerke 
2002; Zheng 2010).  For instance, Tsui-Auch (2004) found that large businesses in 
Singapore, after the 1997 financial crisis, have changed from “family-ruled and 
managed” to “professionally managed family-ruled” firms because of the 
intensifying competition from western businesses and the policy of developmental 
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states.  The findings of Eternity and Fortune support the trend of this 
transformation towards professionalism and formality.  However, when these two 
cases are compared with the major characteristics of Chinese businesses, 
similarities and differences can be noticed.  Firstly, both cases still maintain the 
paternalistic control and rely on interpersonal networks to a great extent.  
Nevertheless, the owners, especially the younger generation, adapted their work 
practices to match with their growing organisations.  For example, the owners 
delegate routine responsibility to middle managers in order to decrease the work 
load whilst using paternalistic control on key strategic issues.  Regarding the use of 
interpersonal relationships in business, both cases still recognize the importance of 
nurturing the interpersonal relationship with their suppliers and customers.  
However, the effort is invested on a group of important suppliers and customers.  
The norm of reciprocity as well as the tangible business benefits from interpersonal 
relationships is taken into account.  The Chinese immeasurable and incessant need 
to reciprocate appears to merge with measurable, contract-like and clear objective 
of western networking.  
Secondly, while Chinese entrepreneurs tend to develop the conglomerate to 
diversify risks, Eternity and Fortune have not used this strategy because the owners 
have only a small family (parents and children only).  They do not have a close 
business relationship with their siblings; the owners of Fortune have a competitive 
relationship with their siblings because they all compete in the home building 
material sector.  Meanwhile, the relatives of Eternity do not regard their business as 
a part of the big family’s business group either.  Each sibling has a stand-alone 
business such as publishing houses, glass and brick factories. Furthermore, the 
value to have a nuclear family is more evident among Thai and Thai-Chinese (as in 
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Overseas Chinese other Southeast Asian countries); this is partly due to the 
effective population control campaign of the government.  Thus, some scholars in 
Chinese businesses forecast the trend that the new generation of Chinese 
entrepreneurs could not rely on the help from their relatives (Tsui, Farh, and Xin 
2000) but would need to seek external and professional managers to run their 
businesses.  This trend is seen in Eternity and Fortune.   
Finally, some features of these two cases are different from other overseas Chinese 
firms.  For example, these two firms in some generations were led by female 
leaders and the executives currently seem to accept the increasing role of female 
family members. With the emerging trend towards equality between male and 
female as well as the need to use daughters to help run the business (Tsui-Auch 
2004), the owners of Fortune acknowledged that they regard their daughters as 
“female sons.”   They wanted their daughter to have equal shares in Fortune and 
will not let their daughters marry out to other families.  It was planned that the 
future husbands of their daughters would marry into the family and would have no 
responsibilities in Fortune’s business.  The idea of “female sons” was modeled 
after a large Thai-Chinese family business in Bangkok.  Thus, the research into the 
changing role of gender in the Chinese family businesses in Thailand and in Asia 
might elucidate the evolution of Chinese businesses. 
Implication: why some practices have changed and others not? 
The development of microfoundations of dynamic capabilities could result in 
certain changes in the old practices of the Chinese firms such as the increase in 
regulations, formal business processes and new organisation structure in Eternity 
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and Fortune.  However, some features, such as the use of interpersonal 
relationships, of Chinese businesses change minimally.  Thus, the question is: why 
are some practices changed and some are not? 
The future of Chinese businesses 
This issue of the change in certain practices fall within the bigger debate about the 
future of Chinese businesses:  will the Western management ideas dominate? Or 
would the Chinese businesses turn into a hybrid system (Yeung 2008)?  The 
dynamic capabilities could be seen as a Western idea to build rationalised working 
processes that promote the firm’s ability to adapt to business environments.   
When Chinese businesses try to improve the microfoundations of the dynamic 
capabilities, conflicts between Western and Chinese practices may arise.  I concur 
with Hamilton (2006)’s view that the Chinese business would evolve into a hybrid 
model.  Business owners seem to adopt the new business practices that mostly 
benefit their organisation, but at the same time match with the cultural context of 
the organisation. 
Thus, my hypothesis is that the old ideas that have no cultural or value supports 
may be easier to change if the new ideas bring in more tangible benefits.  For 
instance, we could see Eternity and Fortune adopt the western ideas of management 
(such as the use of rules and regulation for management and the adoption of 
corporate governance) in order to improve efficiency and obviate potential conflicts 
among family members.  This adoption may be because of the new ideas offering a 
clear benefit compared with the old Chinese practice of informality.  That is, 
informality may be suitable for running a small business because it brings about 
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flexibility and quick actions.  However, when a firm grows larger, formal processes 
and clear rules become necessary.  The informality is, accordingly, easily 
challenged nowadays because it lacks both tangible benefits and Chinese values to 
support its existence. 
On the other hand, the utilisation of guanxi still gives the best benefits to the 
Chinese entrepreneurs; and it is influenced by the Confucius belief --the 
inseparability of relationships from humans (Hamilton 1996). This could be one of 
the explanations about why the practices persist.  However, if we look at some 
issues such as the preference for the eldest son and differential status among gender 
and seniority, these practices which are also supported by old Chinese values are 
under increasing challenges from Western norms.   
 
8.3 Limitation and Potential Areas for Research 
Whilst this study contributed to the debate of the future of Chinese businesses and 
the application of dynamic capabilities model to investigate the adjustment of the 
Thai-Chinese retailers in the changing ecosystem, it suffers from the following 
limitations.  Firstly, this research was a comparative case study and selected two 
retailers in different sectors who were successful in their business.  This could lead 
to potential selection bias; accordingly, future research may gain new insights by 
comparing successful with unsuccessful cases.  The comparison would highlight 
factors that resulted in the survival or the demise of the retailers.  However, future 
researchers should be careful when planning to obtain access to the non-successful 
cases because the owner may be reluctant to share the details of their failure.  
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Secondly, the research question of this exploratory research involved a long 
historical record (20 years of development in the Thai retail sector); thus the 
interview data may not be able to answer this type of research question effectively 
and reliably.    Hence, future research may benefit from focusing on some 
particular timeline so that researchers could gain richer data for that period.  
Finally, the evolution of Chinese businesses can also be regarded as the 
institutional change of the Chinese business practices. Some findings about this 
institutional process were put forward.  For instance, the use of interpersonal 
relationships in emerging economies was predicted to decline compared with the 
increasing importance of capability and resources development (M. W. Peng 2003).  
However, research on the transformation of other Chinese institutions in the 
Chinese firms (such as the decline of paternalistic control, primogenitor, and 
changing gender role) is nascent and could be a fruitful avenue of research.   
Finally, the institutional analysis could serve as a suitable approach to explain the 
change of practices.  Some scholars started to study the process of 
deinstitutionalisation of traditions..  The deinstitutionalisation model (c.f. T. Dacin 
and P. Dacin 2008) could be applied to explain the decline of Chinese institutions.  
For example, why have some Chinese ideas dissipated whereas some are diluted or 
assimilated?  This research would help us fully understand the evolution of Chinese 
businesses.  It could provide an empirical case for the deinstitutionalisation 
research. 
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In conclusion, in the context of globalisation of retailing, the competition 
environment of the Thai retail industry has changed markedly over the past 20 
years.  Foreign retailers have aggressively expanded their businesses all over the 
country.  Eternity and Fortune are an example of Chinese businesses which are 
medium-sized, family-controlled firms with relatively low resources compared 
with retail multinationals.  They could, nevertheless, strategically use their dynamic 
capabilities, entrepreneurial spirits, familiarity with local markets and various 
resources to compete with foreign firms.  The findings show that these two cases 
are far from passive traditional firms adapting to a limited degree to external 
changes.  In fact, they are strategic actors who might be less powerful, but are not 
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Appendix A: Debate, Developments and Critique of Dynamic 
Capabilities 
Debate in dynamic capabilities 
To advance the dynamic capabilities field, scholars have attempted to consolidate 
the basic constructs.  (Di Stefano, M. Peteraf, and Verona 2010:22–23) explored 
the research domain from 1990-2007 on the topic of dynamic capabilities.  They 
discovered that researchers used different definitions and based their work on six 
theoretical roots in management: (1) evolutionary economics (Sidney and Winter 
1982), (2) resource-based view (Wernerfelt 1984), (3) knowledge-based view 
(Kogut and Zander 1992), (4) transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985), (5) 
behavioural theory (Cyert and March 1963), and (6) positional view (Porter 1980).   
Furthermore, most works have drawn upon evolutionary economics and resource-
based views.  The difference in theoretical roots has led to confusion and debate on 
the nature as well as the application of the construct, especially in the perspectives 
that have conflicting assumptions such as the resource-based view (economic 
rationaltily) and behavioural theory (bounded rationality) (c.f.Arend and Bromiley 
2009; Helfat and Peteraf 2009). Nevertheless, Kay (2008) suggested that the 
conflicting perspectives generate a productive debate in dynamic capabilities. 
Different theoretical perspectives resulted in a complementary view because each 
perspective focuses on different parts of the phenomenon.  
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Past research can be classified into five main issues: (1) the nature (processes or 
capabilities), (2) the agent (firm or managers), (3) the action (acting upon the 
existing resources or new resources), (4) the objective of the action (capabilities or 
markets/opportunities), and (5) the effects (adapting to the changing condition or 
achieving competitive advantage).  However, the major debates reflect the nature 
and the effects of dynamic capabilities (Di Stefano et al. 2010:48; Easterby-Smith, 
Lyles, and Peteraf 2009). 
Nature 
Some scholars defined dynamic capabilities as “latent actions” such as capacity, 
ability, capability and enabling devices (Di Stefano et al. 2010:19).  Here are some 
examples of such definitions. 
             - Dynamic capabilities are “[t]he capacity of an organization to 
purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al. 2007).         
             - Dynamic capabilities “relate to high-level activities that link to 
management's ability to sense and then seize opportunities, navigate threats, and 
combine and reconfigure specialized and cospecialized assets to meet changing 
customer needs, and to sustain and amplify evolutionary fitness, thereby building 
long-run value for investors" (Teece 2007:1344).   
             - “Defining ordinary or 'zero-level' capabilities as those that permit a firm 
to 'make a living' in the short term, one can define dynamic capabilities as those 
that operate to extend, modify or create ordinary capabilities.” (Winter 2003:991) 
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Others defined dynamic capabilities as constituent elements including processes, 
routines and patterns (Di Stefano et al. 2010:19).  An example is the definition of 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000:1107) that defines dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s 
processes that use resources --specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, 
gain and release resources-- to match and even create market change.  Dynamic 
capabilities thus are the organizational and strategic routines by which firms 
achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and 
die”  
The “latent” definition may pose challenges for the measurement in empirical 
research.  Helfat et al. (2007:37), consequently, suggested that “processes” might 
provide linkages to observe latent capacity.  Furthermore, dynamic capabilities can 
have various types based on their function e.g. new product development 
capability, post-merger and acquisition capability, innovation, and strategic 
alliances.  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) maintained that this construct is useful for 
not only the dynamic industry such as high tech industry, but it can also be 
applicable to most industries operating in a “moderately dynamic” environment.  
Apart from distinguishing the ordinary capabilities and dynamic capabilities, 
Winter (2003:992-3) argued that there are several ways for an organisation to 
change and not every change is regarded as being due to dynamic capabilities.  
Dynamic capabilities must involve “purposeful” and “routine” actions to change 
operational capabilities in order to achieve some goals (such as creating new 
market or new products).  Firms need specialised resources (e.g. human and 
technology) to maintain this patterned capability and to lead the change role.  
Hence, if a firm employs ad-hoc problem solving and passively reacts to the 
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situation, this is not dynamic capabilities.  Moreover, dynamic capabilities carry a 
cost of maintaining this capability whereas ad-hoc problem solving may not have 
this burden (e.g. the staff can be reassigned to their former operational capability 
after solving the ad-hoc problem).  Nevertheless, in real life, these two types of 
changes are intertwined.  Organisational improvisation in ad-hoc problem solving 
may also arise (Miner, Bassoff, and Moorman 2001).  That is, firms can invent a 
creative solution by drawing on “patterned” and “practised” actions during the 
contingency period.   
In summary, up to now a common definition has been unavailable and this has 
posed limitations on empirical research. (Di Stefano et al. 2010; Barreto 2010) 
Effects 
The debate in this issue has two main themes.  First, for the relationship between 
dynamic capabilities and competitive advantage, some claimed the direct link 
between dynamic capabilities and performance, whereas others suggested that there 
are both direct and indirect effects between these two constructs (Helfat and Peteraf 
2009:97).  According to Teece et al. (1997:517), dynamic capabilities of the firms 
indicate the ability to create new types of competitive advantage.  However, 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000:1008) regarded dynamic capabilities as a form of best 
practice that could level the competitive advantage across firms.   Second, the 
dynamic capability and competitiveness could suffer from tautological issues if 
scholars theorise that dynamic capabilities could result in competitiveness (Arend 
and Bromiley 2009).  Acknowledging this problem, Helfat et al. (2007) offered a 
solution to solve the tautological explanation by breaking the direct link between 
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dynamic capabilities and performance.  The concepts of technological fitness and 
evolutional fitness have been put forward to specify conditions under which 
dynamic capabilities could lead to positive and negative performance of the firm. 
However, the manner of how to measure these two constructs in an empirical study 
is still not definitive.  In summary, the field still needs more research into 
contingencies that moderate the link between dynamic capabilities and 
performance (Barreto 2010). 
Recent developments 
Given the increasing interest in the dynamic capabilities approach, research over 
the last ten years has seen developments in both conceptual and empirical studies.  
Researchers tried to clarify the concepts, study the antecedents as well as pay 
attention to the agency role of management.   
To elaborate the concept, Ambrosini, Bowman, and Collier (2009) suggested that 
dynamic capabilities can be classified into three levels based on the perspective of 
management on the changing ecosystem.  First, incremental dynamic capabilities 
involve the continuous enhancement of firm resources.  Second, renewing dynamic 
capabilities includes the adjustment and increase of resource bases.  Third, 
regenerative dynamic capabilities are concerned with how firms change their 
capabilities and resources.  Regenerative dynamic capabilities can result from 
internal and external knowledge such as from consultants and new leadership. 
Regarding the antecedents of dynamic capabilities, McKelvie and Davidsson 
(2009) explored how changes and access to resource bases (e.g. human capital of 
founders and social capital of workers) would impact the dynamic capabilities of 
  140
the new firms in Sweden.  Bruni and Verona (2009) examined how market 
knowledge affects the dynamic capabilities of firms.  The authors extend the 
concept of dynamic capabilities by proposing “dynamic marketing capabilities” to 
define the processes that can integrate market knowledge, and change and adapt to 
match the changing consumer needs.   
Apart from the external factors that could lead to the change of a firm’s 
capabilities, endogenous factors such as entrepreneurship and management 
initiatives in organisations can also affect the evolution of firms.  Danneels (2010) 
suggested that the "resource cognition" of managers could shape the development 
of dynamic capabilities.  Narayanan et al. (2009) also emphasised the role of 
managers' cognitive orientation in the dynamic capability building.  Management 
takes action based on their cognitive orientation and this pattern of orientation is 
“imprinted” in the organisation.  The management would then canvass resources to 
bring about the capability.  In addition, internal and external contexts do have an 
effect on the managers’ decision to continue or discontinue the capability building.  
Newey and Zahra (2009) studied the relationship between portfolio management 
(dynamic capabilities) and product creation (operating capabilities) during the 
internally-led changes in pharmaceutical firms.  They discovered that dynamic and 
operational capabilities have an interdependent relationship.  Absorptive capacity 
and learning in the product development, once captured by the product portfolio 
level, could turn into dynamic capabilities. 
The attempt to apply the dynamic capabilities to the area of family businesses and 
Chinese management is at an embryonic stage.  Chirico (2008) argued the 
knowledge integration as a dynamic capability to make family businesses 
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competitive.  A model and hypotheses are developed to describe the factors (e.g. 
social capital, affective commitment, relational conflicts) that positively and 
negatively affect the knowledge integration of the family firms. 
Critique    
Arend and Bromiley (2009:75) discussed the weaknesses of dynamic capabilities 
by highlighting that this construct lacks theoretical basis and predictive power.  Up 
to the present, this research stream has failed to contribute to new knowledge. The 
empirical studies are limited on certain industries and mainly used a few case 
analyses instead of longitudinal research design. The contribution to practitioners 
and academics is unclear.  Thus, the authors challenged the necessity of this 
construct and argued for using extant concepts in organisational studies (such as 
change management, organisation learning and organisation change) to address 
these phenomena.   
Helfat and Peteraf 2009 admitted that dynamic capabilities are not a fully 
functional theory, and thus additional research is still needed to enhance this 
approach.  Moreover, given that the area of changes in businesses and 
environments is an interdisciplinary area, it covers a wide range of research 
domains from strategic content and strategy process to the cognition of managers.   
Researchers draw on insights and theoretical toolkits from various perspectives.  
This poses a challenge to have a reconciled model and coherent theory that could 
serve as a solid ground for empirical studies to build upon (Helfat and Peteraf 
2009:93).  However, the authors are optimistic about the prospect of this approach 
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since this perspective provides an integrative framework to answer a key question 
in strategic management and organisational change. 
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Appendix B: Table of Interviewees 
Eternity 












Brian Chief Operating 
Officer 
4 15, 17 June and 
5, 18 July 2009 
Jasmine Advisor 3 16, 22 June and 
5 July 2009 
Allan Chief Executive 
Officer 
2 19 June and      
10 July 2009 
Lyn Brian's wife 1 22 June 2009 
Cecilia Chief Financial Officer 1 22 June 2009 
Nira Allan's wife 1 10 July 2009 
  





Staff member 1 Purchasing manager 1 17 June 2009 
Staff member 2 HR manager 1 18 June 2009 
Staff member 3 Warehouse manager 1 18 June 2009 
Staff member 4 Sales staff 1 21 June 2009 
  




Sale manager 1 Japanese consumer 
product firm 
1 20 June 2009 
Sale manager 2 Japanese consumer 
product firm 
1 20 June 2009 
Sale manager 3 European consumer 
product firm 
1 21 June 2009 
  
      
Customers 
  
Customer 1 Owner of a grocery 
retailer 
1 21 June 2009 
Customer 2 Final customer 1 10 July 2009 
  






Ministry of Commerce 1 14 July 2009 
Government 
officer 2 














Tanya Vice Managing  
Director 
3 26 June, 1 and 
20 July 2009 
Eddy Managing Director 1 19 July 2009 
Alisa Purchasing manager 1 05 July 2009 
Sarah Finance and       
Accounting Manager 
1 02 July 2009 
  




Staff member 1 System development 
manager 
1 28 June 2009 
Staff member 2 Store maintenance 
manager 
1 28 June 2009 
Staff member 3 Warehouse manager 1 29 June 2009 
  




Sale manager 1 A tile company 1 12 July 2009 
Sale manager 2 A sanitary ware 
company 
1 15 July 2009 
Sale manager 3 A cement company 1 21 July 2009 
  
      
Customers Customer 1 Contractor 1 15 July 2009 
  






Ministry of Commerce 1 14 July 2009 
Government 
officer 2 
Ministry of Labour  1 16 July 2009 
 
 
